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ABSTRACT 
THE MOTIVATIONS OF TURKEY AND SOUTH KOREA 
FOR SENDING TROOPS TO PEACE OPERATIONS:  
UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, AND ISAF 
 
Kim, Jin Woo  
M.A., Department of International Relations  
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. H. Tarık Oğuzlu  
 
June 2010 
Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey and South Korea have been actively 
participating in peace operations. Both states have many commonalities, such as 
substantial economic and military capabilities, considerable regional political 
influence, and strong relationships with the United States. Another similarity they 
share is in terms of their decisions to send troops to relatively risky operations in 
which they have no direct economic or strategic interests. The aim of this thesis is to 
find out the decisive motivations of Turkey and South Korea, which could both be 
identified as “allied new middle powers,” for sending troops to the post-Cold War 
peace operations. Through analyzing the processes that led up to Turkey’s and South 
Korea’s decisions to participate in UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, and ISAF, I have 
reached a conclusion that both states are highly motivated by future-oriented 
ideational considerations, namely, their intentions to become multi-regional or global 
actors in the new era. I have also discovered that indirect security concerns, the 
domestic factors, and potential economic benefits are less influential motivating 
factors for both Turkey and South Korea. 
Keywords: Peace Operations, Motivation, Turkey, South Korea, UNOSOM II, 
UNIFIL II, ISAF, Ideational Consideration   
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE VE GÜNEY KORE’NİN BARIŞ OPERASYONLARINA 
ASKER GÖNDERMELERİNİN MOTIVASYONLARI:  
UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, VE ISAF 
 
Kim, Jin Woo  
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. H. Tarık Oğuzlu 
 
June 2010 
Soğuk Savaş bitiminden itibaren, Türkiye ve Güney Kore, çeşitli barış 
operasyonlarına aktif bir şekilde katılmaktadır. İki ülke, oldukça büyük ekonomik ve 
askeri güç, önemli derecedeki bölgesel politika üzerinde etkileri, ve Amerika ile olan 
güçlü ilişkiler gibi benzerliklere sahiptir. Ayrıca, iki ülke, hem tehlike ihtimali 
yüksek olan, hem de direkt ekonomik veya stratejik çıkar sağlamayan operasyonlara 
asker gönderme bakımından birbirine benzemektedir. Bu tez “müttefikli yeni orta 
güçler” olarak tanımlanabilen Türkiye ve Güney Kore’nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası barış 
operasyonlarına asker göndermelerinde etkili olan motivasyonları bulmayı 
hedeflemektedir. Türkiye ve Güney Kore’nin UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, ve ISAF 
operasyonlarına katılma kararlarını almalarına kadar olan süreçlerin incelenme 
sonucu, iki ülkenin geleceğe yönelik düşüncel fikirler, yani, yeni çağda birden fazla 
bölgeye uzanan veya küresel aktör haline gelme niyetleri ile motive edildiği 
öğrenilmiştir. Ayrıca, dolaylı güvenlik kuşkuları, yurtiçi faktörler, ve olası ekonomik 
kazançların Türkiye ve Güney Kore’yi fazla motive etmediği kanıtlanmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış Operasyonları, Motivasyon, Türkiye, Güney Kore, 
UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, ISAF, Düşüncel Fikirler   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Starting from the supervision of truce between Israel and its neighboring 
Arab states in 1948, peace operations became one of the most effective tools of the 
United Nations (UN) for maintaining international peace and security. During the 
Cold War, the major purpose of peace operations was to prevent struggles between 
the United States and the Soviet Union from intruding into peripheral areas.1  Due to 
the frequent paralysis of the UN Security Council (SC), which originated from 
rivalry between the two superpowers, the scope of peace operations was limited, and 
only a small number of states participated in the peace operations of early years.2 As 
the Cold War came to an end, the range of peace operations rapidly extended to 
include a variety of missions, such as assistance to build sustainable institutions of 
governance, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. 
The nature of peace operations also changed as the international community started 
to get involved in intra-state conflicts and civil wars by sending peacekeepers. In 
                                               
1The second UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold labeled this as ‘preventive diplomacy.’ See, 
Claude, Inis Lothair Jr. 1967. Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House): 312-313 
2
 Only 26 states participated in the UN peace operations until 1988. These states were medium-sized 
developed states (e.g. Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway 
and Sweden), larger developing states (e.g. India and Pakistan), and smaller developing states (e.g. 
Fiji, Ghana, Nepal and Senegal). See, The United Nations. 1995.UN Press Release, SG/SM/95/52: 2 
 ２ 
addition, states that had not been involved in any peace operations during the Cold 
War started to send their troops to peace operations. Currently, more than 110,000 
UN personnel from nearly 120 countries are being deployed in conflict zones around 
the world.3 
To a great extent, the participation of more states in peace operations 
following the demise of the Soviet Union can be explained by structural change, 
from a bipolar world to a unipolar world, since it unleashed many new conflicts and 
consequently necessitated more UN engagements for the resolution of those conflicts. 
However, increased need of UN involvement brought by the emergence of a unipolar 
world has limitation in thoroughly explaining states’ participation in peace 
operations. Especially, given the fact that UN member states have no obligation to 
provide their troops for any new peace operations, states’ decisions to send their 
troops to peace operations are not necessarily natural consequences of the post-Cold 
War era. Although the direct impact of change in the global order is hardly deniable, 
it is thought that states’ decisions to take part in peace operations have much to do 
with states’ own considerations, similar to the way they make other foreign policy 
decisions. In other words, some motivating factors are at work in states’ decisions to 
send their troops to peace operations in the post-Cold War era. 
Among the states that started appearing in the field of peace operations 
after the Cold War, a group including Spain, Turkey, Argentina, and South Korea 
made huge progress by contributing sizable troops to various peace operations. What 
makes these states’ contributions distinct from the other newcomers is their active 
participation in relatively risky operations in which they have minor economic or 
strategic interests. These states are similar to one another in terms of substantial 
                                               
3
 The message of the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in ‘Honoring 60 Years of United Nations 
Peacekeeping,’ available at: http://www.un.org/events/peacekeeping60/sgmessage.shtml 
 ３ 
economic and military capabilities, considerable regional political influence, and 
strong relationships with the United States. To represent these states, the term “allied 
new middle powers” will be used throughout my research in order to differentiate 
them from traditional middle powers, such as Australia, Canada, Norway, and 
Sweden. Although an “allied new middle power” has some characteristics of a 
traditional middle power, the former lacked the “international behavior” in the Cold 
War period that was pursued by the latter. 4 In addition, with the arrival of the post-
Cold War period, “allied new middle powers” tend to go beyond their Cold-War 
geographical restrictions, whereas traditional middle powers tend to relocate their 
focus of diplomacy from multinational activities to regional activities.5  
 How can we explain the appearance of “allied new middle powers” as 
active contributors in the field of peace operations in the post-Cold War era, 
especially their active participation in relatively risky operations in which they have 
minor economic or strategic interests? Given the new international order that 
emerged in the 1990s, which gave the majority of states little geopolitical incentive 
to getting involved in conflicts outside their own sphere of influence, the active 
participation of the “allied new middle powers” in such operations seems to be 
extraordinary. It is generally accepted that economic profit from the UN 
reimbursements for the costs of troop contributions is the main motivating factor for 
less-developed or under-developing states, which clearly explains why states like 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Nepal are in the top 10 list of troop contributors 
                                               
4
 ‘International behavior’ or ‘middle power diplomacy’ is the most often used criterion in identifying 
‘middle powers’ during the Cold War. It means the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to 
international problems, to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and to embrace 
notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide diplomacy. See, Cooper, Andrew F. and Higgott, 
Richard A. and Nossal, Kim R. 1993. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a 
Changing World Order (Great Britain: Macmillan Press): 19 
5
 In the post-Cold War period, Australia turned to making relationship with its neighbors in the Asia-
Pacific and the activity of Sweden centered on the Baltic/Hansa region. See, Cooper, Andrew F.1997. 
“Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview,” in Niche Diplomacy, eds., Cooper, Andrew F. 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers): 18-19 
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published by the UN.6 However, this factor is not necessarily relevant for “allied new 
middle powers,” because they already have sizable economic capabilities. On the 
other hand, it is unlikely that “allied new middle powers” send their troops to those 
peace operations with purely altruistic intentions because even seemingly the most 
altruistic Nordic states’ participation in the Cold War peace operations was in fact 
shaped by their common interests.7 This unsolved puzzle, namely, what motivates 
the “allied new middle powers” to dispatch their troops to relatively risky peace 
operations in which they have no direct economic or strategic interests is the main 
focus of my research. Is there one dominating motivation? If not, which motivations 
are at work when the “allied new middle powers” decide to participate in risky and 
irrelevant peace operations in the post-Cold War era?  
The main reason why I choose to analyze the motivations of “allied new 
middle powers” is the scarcity of studies on the subject, despite those states’ 
considerable contribution to peace operations after the end of the Cold War. The 
majority of the existing literature examining motivations for participating in peace 
operations generally focuses on developed Western states, such as France, Canada, 
and Nordic states. Furthermore, in spite of many states’ emergences as new 
contributors to peace operations in the post-Cold War era, little attention has been 
paid to studying the motivations of the new peacekeepers, except some states that 
can be categorized as great powers, such as the United States, Germany, and Japan. 
Since developed Western states or great powers account for just a small part of the 
world in terms of national characteristics, it is difficult for us to get a broader 
understanding of the other states’ motivations for sending troops to peace operations 
                                               
6
 The United Nations. 2008. United Nations Peace Operations Year in Review: 2008 (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information): 51, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2008.pdf 
7
 Jakobsen, Peter V. 2006. Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations (New York: Routledge): 19 
 ５ 
by merely depending on the existing literature. By analyzing the decisive motivations 
of the “allied new middle powers,” which not only have been playing a leading role 
in the post-Cold War peace operations, but also have been in a state of transition 
from developing country status to newly developed country status, a wider range of 
nations’ motivations for participating in peace operations can be understood.      
For the purpose of analyzing the motivations of the “allied new middle 
powers,” my research will be carried out by taking two representative case states, 
Turkey and South Korea. Turkey and South Korea have substantial economic and 
military capabilities as illustrated in Table 1. Furthermore, both states have 
significant political influence in their own regions. Turkey has been playing an active 
role in regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and its regional influence will further  
Table 1. Facts of Turkey and South Korea (2008)8 
                                               
8
 The information used in Table 1. are in reference to CIA World Fact Book (Population and GDP), 
available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ ; SIPRI Military 
Expenditure Database (Military Expenditure), available at: http://milexdata.sipri.org/ ; and the official 
websites of South Korean Ministry of National Defense and Turkish General Staff (Active Military 
Personnel), available at: 
http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndPolicy/mndReform/problem/problem_1/index.jsp#03 and 
http://www.tsk.tr/eng/genel_konular/kuvvetyapisi.htm  
 
 
Turkey 
 
South Korea 
 
Population 
 
76.8 million (17th) 
 
48.5 million (25th) 
 
GDP 
 
903 billion $ (17th) 
 
1,338 billion $ (14th) 
 
Military Expenditure 
 
2.1% of GDP 
 
2.6% of GDP 
 
Active Military Personnel 
 
514,000  
 
655,000  
 ６ 
increase once the full membership negotiations with the European Union (EU),  
which began in 2005, are completed. Similarly, South Korea has been projecting its 
regional leverage in regional organizations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus 
Three, and its rapid transformation into a wealthy and industrialized economy is 
being lauded and emulated by other regional states. When it comes to these two 
states’ relations with the United States, Turkey has retained a military alliance with 
the United States through NATO since its membership in 1952 and has upgraded 
bilateral economic relations with the United States through the Economic Partnership 
Commission that was established in 2002. South Korea has also held a bilateral 
military alliance with the United States following the Korean War (1950 – 1953) and 
is currently the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States. Turkey’s and 
South Korea’s strong relationships with the superpower in the post-Cold War era 
have remained unchanged, although both states have experienced discord over some 
issues. 9  Other than the aforementioned characteristics of an “allied new middle 
power,” Turkey and South Korea also have many other commonalities. The two 
states have similar democratic political systems and maintain a conscription system 
for their militaries. Both states also have some unsolved problems with neighboring 
states10, and thus need constant international and US support. Furthermore, both 
Turkey and South Korea share the view that a stable global and regional order is 
essential for their further development in the political, economic, and security fields. 
These commonalities between Turkey and South Korea will help me obtain more 
                                               
9
 For instance, the Turkish – US relations suffered a rupture in 2003 following the failure of adopting 
the resolution allowing US troops to use Turkish territories in attacking Iraq. There was also huge 
anti-American sentiment in South Korea due to the military vehicle accident, which killed two South 
Korean girls in 2002.   
10
 Turkey has problems with Greece, Syria, and Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government) and South Korea 
has problems with North Korea and Japan.  
 ７ 
objective and reliable results. 
There is no doubt that both Turkey and South Korea have been actively 
participating in peace operations since the end of the Cold War. Turkey, which had 
distanced itself from peace operations during the Cold War except for the UN-led 
multinational force in the Korean War, started contributing to various peace 
operations in 1988. Turkey’s increased commitments to peace operations can be 
easily seen from its taking over the 2nd and 7th command of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. South Korea had not participated in any 
peace operation during the Cold War. However, South Korea has been increasing its 
commitments to various peace operations, starting from its first peace operation in 
1993. South Korea’s current plan to establish a national peace operation center and to 
create a standby high readiness force for overseas operations in 2010 clearly reveals 
its willingness to participate in peace operations.11  
When it comes to the selection of peace operations to be analyzed, three 
post-Cold War peace operations will be chosen. These three chosen cases are in 
accordance with the two criteria, “risk” and “minor nature of direct economic or 
strategic attractiveness.” These three operations in question are the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL II), and ISAF in Afghanistan. Turkey and South Korea participated (or are 
participating) in these three peace operations with quite sizable troops (more than a 
company-sized unit), not a merely symbolic number of troops. All the three peace 
operations are relatively dangerous, carried out under Chapter VI plus (UNIFIL II) or 
Chapter VII (UNOSOM II and ISAF) of the UN Charter, and hence Turkey and 
                                               
11
 Joong-Ang Daily News. 2009. ‘군, 내년초 해외파병 상비부대 창설 (South Korean Armed Forces, 
planning to establish a standby high readiness force for oversea operations in the next year),’ 04 
October, available at: http://article.joins.com/article/article.asp?total_id=3805680 
 ８ 
South Korea risked potential casualties when deciding to join the operations.12 The 
high risk of these three peace operations implies that there might be more strong 
motivations of Turkey and South Korea for sending troops. In addition, all the three 
operations have little to do with both Turkey and South Korea in terms of direct 
economic or strategic attractiveness. It is difficult to say that Turkey has no interest 
in the peace operations carried out in Europe (the Balkans) and South Korea has no 
interest in the peace operations carried out in Asia (East Asia), because each region 
constitutes a political, economic, and security priority for each state. However, 
Somalia in Africa and Afghanistan in Central Asia do not necessarily constitute any 
significance to either Turkey or South Korea due to their geographical remoteness. 
Lebanon’s little relevance to South Korea is also easily explainable by taking into 
consideration the long distance between the two. In addition, we can derive 
Lebanon’s little relevance to Turkey from the fact that Turkey has kept distancing 
itself from Lebanon even after the end of the Cold War, when the former gradually 
started turning its attention to the Middle East, due to the existence of Arab 
nationalism, power of the Greek Orthodox population, and Armenian populations in 
the latter.13 Furthermore, there are other reasons why these three post-Cold War 
operations have been chosen for my research.  
UNOSOM II is one of the largest, most expensive, and most ambitious UN 
peace operations to date. For both Turkey and South Korea, UNOSOM II was the 
first peace operation with quite large contingents (Turkey: a 300-person mechanized 
infantry contingent / South Korea: a 250-person engineering construction contingent) 
                                               
12
 UNOSOM ended with total 160 fatalities and UNIFIL has total 282 fatalities by 2009. It is also 
reported that coalition casualties in Afghanistan except the United States and the United Kingdom are 
383 by 2009. See, United Nations Peacekeeping. 2009. (3) Fatalities by Mission and Appointment 
Type, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/ and iCasualites: Operation Enduring 
Freedom. 2009. Fatalities by Country, available at: http://icasualties.org/OEF/Index.aspx 
13
 Altunisik, Meliha B. 2007. Lübnan Krizi: Nedenleri ve Sonuçları (The Labanese Crisis: Reasons 
and Results) (Istanbul: Tesev Yayinlari): 26 
 ９ 
in the post-Cold War era. Since UNOSOM II was carried out right after the end of 
the Cold War, and the two states had little or no experience with peace operations 
until then, it is thought that the initial motivations of Turkey and South Korea in the 
post-Cold War era can be found out through examining UNOSOM II.  
UNIFIL II started when the UN SC adopted Resolution 1701 on 11 August 
2006, which enhanced the original mandate of UNIFIL, following the July/August 
2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. UNIFIL II is one of the three large-scale UN peace 
operations still actively ongoing.14 In addition, it is the newest peace operation for 
Turkey, which has provided an engineering construction contingent as well as four 
naval ships, and the most remote peace operation involving combat units for South 
Korea. Through examining UNIFIL II, the current motivations of Turkey and South 
Korea can be discovered.  
ISAF is a UN-mandated and NATO-administered peace operation. ISAF 
was established with UN SC Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001, following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. Until August 2003 when NATO assumed command 
of ISAF, its missions had been carried out by volunteer individual nations with a 6-
month rotation system. ISAF is no doubt at the center of international concerns 
nowadays. Since ISAF is somewhat different from other UN-controlled peace 
operations in terms of formation, scope of missions, budget, and actors involved, we 
can find out whether Turkey and South Korea are motivated by some different kinds 
of factors that are unseen in their decisions to participate in the UN-controlled peace 
operations. What makes ISAF more suitable for my research is Turkey’s huge 
                                               
14
 The other two large UN peace operations are African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID) and United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC). See, United Nations Peacekeeping. 2009. Peacekeeping Chart: 1991-present, 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/chart.pdf 
 １０ 
commitments and South Korea’s decision to become part of ISAF despite its troop 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2007.     
All the three selected peace operations involve the United States either 
directly or indirectly. In Somalia, the United States led the Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) and provided huge military and economic supports for the activities of 
UNOSOM II. In Afghanistan, the United States has contributed more than half of 
ISAF troops and is leading all the missions carried out there. The United States did 
not join UNIFIL II, but it not only played a key role in designing the force at the 
initial phase, but also supported the performance of UNIFIL II through its European 
partners. As mentioned before, one of the main characteristics of the “allied new 
middle powers” is their strong relations with the United States. In order for us to 
examine any impact of the US factor on both Turkey’s and South Korea’s decisions 
to send troops to peace operations, a case operation should include the involvement 
of the United States. In this regard, these three case operations are more appropriate 
for my research than any other peace operations. 
In my research, the descriptive approach will be applied. Secondary 
research sources, such as academic journals, books, newspapers, and TV programs, 
will be used as supporting data. Since my research focuses on analyzing the 
motivations of Turkey and South Korea, official records and documents of the two 
states, which include statements by key political figures, such as the President, the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defense, 
will constitute the major part of the research sources. In order to examine the 
economic aspects of the two states’ motivations, there will be primarily the usage of 
annual reports published by Turkish and South Korean embassies in Somalia, 
Lebanon, and Afghanistan respectively. 
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This thesis is systemically designed to analyze main motivations of the two 
states representing the “allied new middle powers,” Turkey and South Korea, in the 
course of their decisions to participate in UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, and ISAF. In the 
first chapter, states’ general motivations for participating in peace operations will be 
examined. Based on the main assumptions and arguments of the three theoretical 
perspectives in the IR discipline (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), states’ 
general motivations will be drawn, and specific examples representing each 
motivation will be provided. Preliminary assumption of which motivations are more 
decisive for the “allied new middle powers” will be made, and four probable 
motivations that are in concordance with common characteristics of the “allied new 
middle powers,” that is, (1) alliance with the US ↔ indirect security concerns (or US 
pressure); (2) democratic political system ↔ the domestic factor (public opinion); (3) 
rising economic power ↔ potential economic benefit; and (4) willingness and 
activeness in the field of peace operations ↔ ideational considerations, will be 
determined for empirical analysis. 
In the second chapter, general information on the three selected peace 
operations (UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, and ISAF), such as the origin, mandate, 
conduct, and development will be provided. In addition, Turkey’s and South Korea’s 
contributions to each case operation will be discussed as a preparatory step for 
analyzing the two states’ decisive motivations for participating in the three peace 
operations.  
In the third chapter, an empirical analysis of Turkey’s and South Korea’s 
motivations for sending troops to the three peace operations selected as cases, will be 
carried out. Special attention will be given to examining the actual impact of the four 
probable motivations of the “allied new middle powers” -- indirect security concerns 
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(or US pressure); the domestic factor (public opinion); potential economic benefit; 
and ideational considerations -- on the two states’ decisions to send troops to Somalia, 
Lebanon, and Afghanistan, respectively. After analyzing the motivations of Turkey 
and South Korea on a case-by-case basis, combined results of the whole analyses 
will be suggested. 
In the conclusion, the main findings of my research will be summarized and 
its scholarly contribution will also be emphasized. In addition, some suggestions for 
a future research will be made. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
STATES’ GENERAL MOTIVATIONS FOR  
SENDING TROOPS TO PEACE OPERATIONS  
& ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESEARCH  
 
 
 
Before analyzing Turkey’s and South Korea’s motivations for sending 
troops to the three selected peace operations, it is necessary to examine states’ 
general motivations for participating in peace operations. Although there are many 
studies on peace operations, the majority of those studies do not sufficiently deal 
with what leads states to send troops to peace operations. Instead, they mostly focus 
on other areas of the topic, such as the development, principles, functions and 
effectiveness of peace operations.15 Even a small number of studies looking at states’ 
motivations do not provide the motivations in a theoretically categorized way, since 
they are generally written based on just one state’s motivations in a particular peace 
operation. Thus, I will examine the three theoretical perspectives in the IR discipline 
-- realism, liberalism, and constructivism -- and draw these perspectives’ comments 
on states’ motivations for sending troops to peace operations. Based on each 
theoretical perspective’s main assumptions and arguments, states’ motivations will 
                                               
15
 Johnstone, Ian. 2005. “Peace Operations Literature Review,” Center on International Cooperation, 
August: 11 
 １４ 
be drawn and specific examples representing each motivation will be provided. In 
addition, which motivations can be more decisive for the “allied new middle powers” 
will be considered, taking into account their characteristics, that is, the substantial 
economic and military capabilities, the considerable regional political influence, and 
the strong relationship with the United States. What are to be suggested as decisive 
motivations of the “allied new middle powers” will constitute the main focus of the 
case analyses.  
 
 2.1. Realism and States’ Motivations 
Realism assumes that states, main actors in world politics, seek power in an 
anarchic system, where no centralized authority exists over all the states. In seeking 
power, states endeavor not only to increase their own military and economic 
capabilities, but also to prevent any other state from changing the balance of power 
in its favor. Classical realism, which is represented by Hans J. Morgenthau, attributes 
the reason of states’ seeking power to the “human lust for power,” while structural 
realism, which is represented by Kenneth N. Waltz, finds the reason in the structure 
of the international system that forces states to pursue power.16 From realist scholars’ 
point of view, power is the core of defining national interests, which is pursued in the 
form of a state’s foreign policies. Among various national interests defined in 
political, military, and economic terms, national survival and security are given 
priority. Morgenthau argues, “in a world where a number of sovereign nations 
compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations 
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must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements.” 17  This 
implies that since other national interests are by no means achievable without the 
maintenance of territorial integrity or the autonomy of political order of a state, 
national survival and security should be considered primarily. It is generally 
suggested by realist scholars that forming alliance with other states and gaining 
material capabilities are proper means to assure national survival and security.18 By 
taking realism into consideration, states’ motivations for taking part in peace 
operations can be categorized as follows.         
First of all, states which face direct security concerns originating from a 
conflict situation where a peace operation is envisaged will be motivated to send 
their troops to the operation. Since security is one of the most important national 
interests of a state, according to realism, damage to it will not be tolerable. If direct 
security challenges can be abated or totally solved by sending a small number of 
troops to peace operations, that will be a desirable option for states confronting those 
challenges. We can more easily discern this motivation from states’ participations in 
proximate peace operations. For instance, it is well known that the members of 
ASEAN participated in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) with the consideration that their involvement in the operation would 
contribute to their national security interests. 19  In addition, Nigeria actively 
contributed to the two peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone as part of the 
Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) 
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due to the fear that conflicts in those countries could jump their arbitrary boundaries 
and destabilize the neighboring states.20    
Although it is true that conflicts in a certain area are more likely to threaten 
the security of neighboring or nearby states, this does not mean that those conflicts 
have no possibility to directly harm the security of remote states. Especially in a 
globalized world, conflicts in a certain area are no longer entirely irrelevant to the 
security of remote states. As Georg Sorenson argues, the insecurity dilemma, which 
is the existence of weak or failed states who are major threats to the security of their 
own populations, has emerged as a new core security concern of the whole 
international community in the post-Cold War era.21 In order to make the world order 
more liberal and peaceful, states are required not to turn a blind eye to the situation 
of failed states, as long as humanitarian intervention in the form of peacekeeping or 
peacemaking is not transformed into the extreme liberal imperialism.22 States also 
become increasingly concerned about globalized security issues, such as terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and piracy. Currently, more 
than 90 countries around the world voluntarily support the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), which was launched by the US President Bush in 2003 and endorsed 
by UN SC Resolution 1540, with the aims of stopping the trafficking of WMDs, 
delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern.23 Furthermore, in response to the recent upsurge of piracy off 
the Somali coast, a coordinated naval peace operation with more than 30 warships, 
either from individual states or from NATO and the EU, is being conducted around 
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the area in order to achieve what was called upon in UN SC Resolution 1838, the 
repression of acts of piracy.24  
Secondly, states can be motivated by indirect security concerns. Indirect 
security concerns mostly originate from the relational situation of states, such as 
alliance dependence. Forming an alliance against an emerging power or a perceived 
threat is regarded as a proper way of seeking national security by realist scholars. For 
smaller states, especially, alliance is one of the most significant power elements.25 
Small states (and sometimes middle states), which are asymmetrically dependent on 
great powers in general, face two anxieties in alliances: abandonment and 
entrapment.26 Abandonment is a situation in which great powers fail to help their 
allied states in time of need, while entrapment is a situation in which allied states 
become entangled in a conflict central to great powers’ interests, but relatively 
peripheral to their own. In the face of the alliance security dilemma between 
abandonment and entrapment, small allied states support great powers, if their 
dependence on the great powers outweighs their fear of entrapment. In other words, 
if great powers’ assistance is essential for handling small allied states’ own security 
challenges, either internal or external, the small allied states are likely to behave in 
the direction the great powers desire.  
The concern over being abandoned by allied great powers can also be at 
work, when states decide whether to send troops to a peace operation. If allied great 
powers are in favor of engaging in a certain peace operation and expect dependent 
states to participate in the operation, there will remain few options for those states 
except meeting the allied great powers’ expectation, that is, troop commitments to 
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the peace operation. In short, states can be motivated to take part in a far off or 
seemingly irrelevant peace operation along with their core security-providers in order 
to prevent any decrease in the reliability of their alliances, which are essential for 
coping with security challenges within and around them. This motivating factor is 
seen more in the US-led peace operations. For instance, many of Caribbean states 
and Israel were pressured to participate in the Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti 
and thereafter in the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), since the United 
States wanted to lend to the US-dominated operation a multilateral character.27 The 
same factor can be easily found in the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) and Kuwait’s 
participations in UNITAF in Somalia, since these two states’ security dependence on 
the United States increased rapidly following the Persian Gulf War (1990 – 1991).28 
Georgia’s recent participation in peace operations can be similarly regarded. Faced 
with internal security concerns emanating from the two de facto autonomous 
provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and external security concerns coming from 
Russia, Georgia highly depends on Western allies, especially on the United States, 
for its security. For the purpose of consolidating its reliance on the allies, Georgia 
has participated in both NATO-led peace operations and MNF in Iraq along with the 
United States since 1999. It is also highly likely that many Central and East 
European countries sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan with the hope that the United 
States would come to their aid if they were attacked by Russia, their giant neighbor. 
Thirdly, participation in peace operations can be regarded by states as a 
good opportunity to increase their power.  Realists generally regard military force as 
the most important element of state power along with economic strength, which is 
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easily fungible into military force.29 The changing nature of international politics 
following the end of the Cold War, however, has made co-optive or soft power of 
states as important as tangible hard power.30 Troops in peace operations not only get 
actual combat experience that is invaluable in peacetime, but also acquire military 
skills, such as planning, communicating, and coordinating with multinational forces. 
They can also share experience with other states’ troops and learn how to carry out 
operations in different geographical areas and different climate conditions. 
Operational skills that can be acquired through participating in peace operations are 
particularly valuable for states experiencing similar conflicts. For instance, through 
participating in various peace operations, India got valuable experience that could be 
utilized for domestic conflict resolution in divided areas such as Assam, the Punjab, 
and Kashmir.31  
Along with qualitative improvements in the capability of military force, 
military equipments and foreign aid in the form of military assistance can also be 
gained. States in peace operations can receive weapons and vehicles from better-
equipped troop contributors. For example, the Pakistani contingent received 
protective vehicles from Germany when it participated in the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslavia.32 Jordan’s participation 
in peace operations has also much to do with this motivating factor. It is widely 
known that the Jordanian contingent received US assistance in UNPROFOR. 33 
Jordan’s recent participation in ISAF is also thought to be in part driven by the 
                                               
29
 Goldstein, Joshua S. 1996. International Relations. 2nd Edition (New York: HarperCollins): 58 
30
 Co-optive or soft power means a state’s ability to get other countries to want what it wants. Soft 
power arises from such resources as cultural and ideological attractions as well as rules and 
institutions of international regimes. See, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 1990. “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy No. 
80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn): 166, 168  
31
 Bullion, Alan James. 2005. “India,” in The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, eds., 
Sorenson, David S. and Wood, Pia Christina (New York: Frank Cass): 199 
32
 Findlay, Trevor. 1996. “The new peacekeepers and the new peacekeeping,” Australian National 
University IR Department Working Paper No. 1996/2: 6 
33
 Ibid. 
 ２０ 
increased US military assistance following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, since it was 
mainly allocated for nations supporting the United States in the war on global 
terrorism. In fact, Jordan received 460 million US dollars from the United States in 
2005 as a reward for its active involvement in the war on terrorism.34       
In addition, states participating in peace operations can increase their soft 
power potential by gaining prestige and making their images in the eyes of other 
states cooperative and credible. The more a state proves itself as a responsible 
member of the international community, the more it will gain the power of 
attractiveness in the eyes of others. Since legitimacy is an indispensable condition for 
soft power, and one way to increase legitimacy is showing multilateralism35, states 
desiring to increase their soft power will be motivated to be part of peace operations. 
This is predominantly because peace operations became the main tools of the UN, 
the most exemplary multilateral institution in the world, for maintaining international 
peace and security. For states hoping to assume key positions in the UN, such as 
permanent membership of the SC, to increase soft power potential can be a crucial 
motivating factor in deciding whether to send troops to peace operations.  For 
instance, India has been lobbying to become a permanent member of the SC and is 
competing with other Third World states for the position. Although the time of 
revision in the current UN system has not been decided yet, India believes that its 
huge contribution to UN peace operations will make other member states perceive it 
as a suitable candidate for a future permanent member seat.36        
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2.2. Liberalism and States’ Motivations 
Although there are several strands of liberalism, such as republican 
liberalism, commercial liberalism, sociological liberalism, interdependence 
liberalism, and neoliberalism, all the liberal scholars generally take a positive view of 
human nature and agree that cooperation among states based on mutual interests will 
prevail.37 According to classical liberalists, domestic actors and structures have a 
great impact on the foreign policy of states. Andrew Moravcsik argues, “States 
represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state 
officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics.” 38  This 
implies that the foreign policy of a state is affected by the preferences of some 
domestic individuals and groups who effectively pressure the central government 
officials to carry out policies in the intended direction. When it comes to 
neoliberalism, the role of international institutions in facilitating multilateral 
cooperation among states in an interdependent world is highly valued. Neoliberalism 
relies on the core assumption that, even in collective actions, states calculate the 
costs and benefits of different courses of action and choose the one that gives them 
the highest net pay-off. 39  It is also generally accepted that for states, economic 
benefits and other “low political” issues are as important as security issues in 
considering the pay-off.40 We can infer from liberalism two broad motivations of 
states for sending troops to peace operations, as suggested below.         
Firstly, domestic impact on states’ decisions to send troops can be 
considered. According to liberalism, the foreign policy of a state is not independent 
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of its domestic politics, which incorporates a variety of actors. Rather, the two are 
somehow entangled and influence one another. Robert D. Putnam shows this 
entanglement in a simple way by adopting “two-level games,” and argues that 
domestic groups seek their interests by pressuring their government to make 
favorable decisions at the national level, while national governments try to satisfy 
domestic demands at the international level.41 Given the fact that dispatching troops 
to peace operations is also one of the foreign policy decisions of a state, we can think 
that certain domestic pressure groups play a role in making the government to take 
such actions. One good example showing the role of domestic pressure groups is the 
United States’ participation in UNMIH. The US government was initially reluctant to 
be involved in the Haitian problem despite the increasing number of illegal refugees 
flooding into it. However, the reluctance was overcome as the Clinton administration 
was pressured not only from civil right groups who demanded equal treatment for 
Haitian refugees, but also from the Congressional Black Caucus that requested a 
fundamental solution to the Haitian problem through handling the Haitian political 
system. 42  At times, specific individuals are as influential as pressure groups in 
steering a government towards participation in peace operations. For instance, Hans 
Hekkerup, the former Defense Minister of Denmark, played a pivotal role in sending 
the Danish troops equipped with heavy weapons to Bosnia despite the absence of 
political consensus and public support.43               
In addition, the role of public opinion in states’ decisions to send troops to 
peace operations can be considered under the same category. Public opinion, which 
is generally formed as a result of media coverage, can prompt states to do something 
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about conflicts in other regions. For instance, it is well known that “CNN effect” 
created popular pressure on the political leaders of the United States to take 
necessary measures for stopping the starvation in Somalia and the ethnic cleansing in 
the Former Yugoslavia.44 In addition, Swedish participation in the peace operations 
conducted in the Former Yugoslavia stood on the basis of strong public support. 
Almost 78 % of the Swedish population showed their support for the decisions to 
deploy troops and to make troops available for UN peace operations involving a risk 
of enforcement actions.45    
Secondly, states can be motivated by visible or latent economic gains that 
would be achievable as a result of participating in peace operations. In an 
interdependent world, political, military, economic, and social issues are, to a great 
extent, interrelated and this linkage makes the separation of one issue from another 
issue difficult. Peace operations are no exception to this phenomenon. Peace 
operations no longer remain just within the boundary of issues mainly delegated to 
the military. Peace operations in recent years have had close relations with other 
issues. They are especially increasingly related with economic issues, as new 
missions are given to the operations, and new actors are involved in these 
multifaceted operations. One of the economic benefits that can be earned from 
participating in peace operations is the UN financial reimbursement for the costs of 
troop contributions. The UN compensates states volunteering troops to peace 
operations at a flat rate of a little over $1,000 per soldier per month with some 
supplementary payments.46 Since the UN money given to participating states is quite 
sizable, this can be a motive appealing especially to less-developed or under-
                                               
44
 Farrell, Theo. 2003. “Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations,” in Strategy in the 
Contemporary World, eds., Baylis, John and others (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 296 
45
 Jakobsen, Peter V. 2006. Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations (New York: Routledge): 181 
46
 The United Nations. 2003. Today’s Peacekeepers: Questions and Answers on United Nations 
Peacekeeping, available at: http://www.un.org/events/peacekeepers/2003/docs/qanda.htm 
 ２４ 
developing states. For instance, Fiji’s participation in peace operations since 1978 
arises mainly from its understanding that the UN reimbursement is a significant 
source of foreign exchange.47  
Furthermore, some potential economic benefits could also be considered. 
By contributing to the peaceful resolution of a conflict and maintaining troop 
presence, states can provide their own private sectors with opportunities to benefit, 
not only from post-conflict reconstruction (short-term profit), but also from post-
conflict investment (long-term profit).48 For instance, it is argued that many Western 
contributors in the peace operations carried out in the Balkans were motivated, in 
part, by a desire to integrate “south-east Europe into the sphere of Western 
capitalism.”49 If a peace operation is envisaged in areas having economic attractions, 
states hoping to take advantage of those attractions are more likely to participate in 
such an operation. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is a 
good example. Mozambique possesses abundant reserves of mineral resources, 
natural gas, and coal. With the start of ONUMOZ, 900 out of the 1,250 government-
controlled firms were privatized in Mozambique, and the majority of foreign 
investments flew from the United States, Canada, and Japan, which were all 
participants in the operation.50 It is also known that Italy’s key role during the peace 
process allowed its businesses to begin making profits in a broad range of sectors in 
Mozambique, such as energy, construction, and transportation.51  
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2.3. Constructivism and States’ Motivations 
Different from realism and liberalism, constructivism emphasizes the social 
dimensions of international relations and demonstrates the significance of norms, 
rules and language in continuous processes of interaction among actors. The identity 
of a state, which is the source of its preferences and consequent actions, is regarded 
intersubjective, that is, dependent on historical, cultural, political and social 
context. 52  For constructivists, national interests are variable in accordance with 
identities which are constructed in the social interplay of elites, populations, and state 
institutions. Alexander Wendt supports this idea by arguing, “Identities are the basis 
of interests. Actors do not have ‘portfolio’ of interests… they define their interests in 
the process of defining situation.”53  National interests are not merely observable 
objects as realists generally accept; rather, they are the result of social constructions 
in which meanings are produced and their legitimacy is conferred through a process 
of representation.54  In other words, what states value or what states believe to be 
good or appropriate can also be national interests, which are pursued by them in the 
international arena.  
The main assumptions and arguments of constructivism give us a hint that 
states can participate in peace operations with ideational motivations, which have 
been internalized and legitimized through states’ own formative processes. One pure 
ideational motivation is altruism or humanitarianism. Starting from the end of 
twentieth century, states have become more concerned with the crises of other states 
and remote regions, especially when those crises caused human suffering and human 
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rights abuses. 55  This means that states felt responsible for the conflicts of other 
peoples, regardless of the amount of their own material interest at stake. Since 
international cooperation in solving international problems of any kind and in 
promoting fundamental human rights is one of the purposes of the UN 56 , 
participation in peace operations corresponding to this purpose is regarded as an 
obligation of a member of the international community. The fact that states in peace 
operations should be ready to sacrifice their own soldiers’ and citizens’ lives, which 
are no doubt the most important values to be protected by states, also reveals states’ 
humanitarian considerations to a certain extent. 
It is generally accepted that traditional middle powers, such as Australia, 
Canada, and the Nordic states were in part motivated to participate in the peace 
operations of the Cold War era by this altruistic or humanitarian thinking. During the 
Cold War, these states regarded participation in peace operations as the quintessence 
of good international citizenship.57 Strengthening the international rule of law and 
promoting peaceful settlement of all disputes was domestically legitimized in the 
egalitarian and humanist societies of traditional middle powers without any huge 
controversy and pursued in the international arena through active participation in 
peace operations. Among traditional middle powers, Sweden was the most salient 
actor motivated by altruistic thinking. For instance, anti-apartheid was the source of 
Sweden’s active participation in the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) in Namibia and its enthusiastic involvement in other South African peace 
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processes of the 1980s.58                
 There are also other ideational motivations that originate from states’ 
internally embedded or constituted norms and ideas. These kinds of ideational 
motivations are more influential for states that incrementally began to participate in 
peace operations in the post-Cold War era. One exemplary state is Germany. The 
foreign policy of Germany during the Cold War was based on its culture of reticence, 
which was represented by slogans like “never again war” and “never again 
Auschwitz.” West Germany was reluctant to take part in any kind of military 
intervention due to what it learned from World War II and the Holocaust. After 
unification, however, Germany gradually moved away from the traditional culture, as 
the request for normalization of German foreign policy emerged from political 
parties and the German Constitutional Court found room for German military 
deployment outside national borders, the pursuit of “safeguarding peace.”59 Although 
Germany initially wanted to play a role as a pure “civilian power” committed to 
further international peace and cooperation without being involved in “out of area” 
operations, it became apparent that Germany would hardly eschew its international 
obligation to send the German troops to a wider range of military operations in the 
post-Cold War era.60 Germany followed cautious steps designed to gradually soothe 
public concern about participation in “out of area” operations and started to commit 
troops to peace operations that aimed at defending humanitarian and democratic 
values, while firmly adhering to the condition of “never on our own.” The use of 
military force on the basis of multilateralism became acceptable for Germany, as 
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long as all the other political and economic means of the state were consumed 
beforehand.61  The most crucial motivating factor for Germany in considering its 
participation was projecting its soft power capabilities. Germany, which has been 
competing for the leadership of the EU, wanted its soft power security approach to 
become the basic European model for security policy, which employs firstly non-
military means and then military means only as a last resort.62 Through participating 
in peace operations, Germany aimed to make its status in Europe firm and highly 
valued, while at the same time make itself seen as a non-threatening state.          
Similar to Germany, Japan also approached peace operations with its own 
ideational motivations. Japan, which had strict constitutional restraints on the use of 
military force, became a target of international criticism after its apathy towards the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Following the Gulf War, opinion among the 
Japanese public and the major political parties rapidly shifted to favoring Japan’s 
contribution to peace operations and, as a consequence, the “PKO Law” was 
established in 1992.63 The five principles of the initial “PKO Law” had limited the 
role of Japan to simply providing logistical support. However, an amendment passed 
in 2001 expanded the scope of the Japanese participation in peace operations by 
allowing Japanese peacekeepers to carry out missions like monitoring ceasefires, 
disarming local forces, patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting the transport of 
weapons, and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons. 64  By gradually 
participating in peace operations, Japan aimed to develop a distinctive international 
policy as a new political power. It wanted to adopt a UN-centered policy so as to 
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broaden its diplomatic options internationally, while overcoming its tradition of 
siding with the United States. In addition, Japan intended to project a positive or 
cooperative image to regional states that had anti-militarism attitudes towards it. 
Japan’s active participation in peace operations would lead many states that once 
experienced Japanese colonial rule to have a perception that Japan finally became a 
“normal” state, shaking its previous aggressive and colonial behavior off. In short, 
Japan’s contribution to regional peace operations was a way of building regional 
confidence for the purpose of enhancing its political status in Asia and the Pacific.65       
 
2.4. Preliminary Assumption: Decisive Motivations of the “Allied New 
Middle Powers” 
Henceforth, attention will be paid to reasoning which motivations out of 
what have been listed in the previous sub-sections are more decisive for the two 
representative “allied new middle powers,” Turkey and South Korea, in their 
decisions to send troops to the selected three post-Cold War peace operations. Given 
the substantial economic capabilities of Turkey and South Korea, it is thought that 
economic profit from the UN reimbursements, which is the main motivating factor 
for less-developed or under-developing states, hardly motivates them. In addition, 
since Turkey and South Korea already maintain relatively huge and advanced 
military forces, quantitative and qualitative improvement in the power position 
through participating in peace operations is less likely to appeal to them. Furthermore, 
charitable thinking seems to be less relevant for either Turkey or South Korea, 
because both states do not have a long-established tradition of giving priority to 
humanist values at home. What makes this motivating factor less likely for Turkey  
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Table 2. Concordance between Characteristics and Motivations 
 
and South Korea is the fact that even traditional middle powers, which had 
participated in the peace operations of the Cold War era with altruistic thinking, 
showed a tendency to move away from such thinking in the post-Cold War era.66 
Direct security concerns can also be ruled out as one of the decisive motivations. 
Unlike the United States and other great powers, the two representative “allied new 
middle powers” have limited global influence. Turkey and South Korea can be 
concerned about what happens in Somalia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan in a globalized 
world. However, the remoteness and irrelevance of the three areas still make the two 
states less exposed to the security risks coming from those areas. The fact that 
Turkey and South Korea confront their own security challenges from domestic 
separatist organizations or from neighboring states also makes the factor of direct 
security concerns in these peace operations less crucial for them. Thus, the degree of 
perceived immediate threat from a conflict situation in irrelevant parts of the world is 
thought to be insufficient to fully drive Turkey and South Korea to engage in such 
conflicts. 
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Characteristic 
 
Motivation 
 
Alliance with the US 
 
Indirect security concerns 
 
Democratic political system 
 
Pressure group & Public opinion 
 
Rising economic power 
 
Potential economic benefit 
 
Willingness & Activeness 
 
Ideational considerations  
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 Having excluding the aforementioned motivations, there remain four 
motivations. The remaining motivations are considered as more decisive for the 
“allied new middle powers,” since they are in concordance with their common 
characteristics as illustrated in Table 2. Therefore, in Chapter IV, I will focus on 
analyzing to what extent these four motivations actually functioned in Turkey’s and 
South Korea’s decisions to participate in the selected three peace operations.         
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE CASE PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
 
 
In this chapter, general information on the three selected peace operations 
(UNOSOM II, UNIFIL II, and ISAF), such as the origin, mandate, conduct, and 
development will be provided. Although Turkey and South Korea did not participate 
in UNOSOM I (July 1992 – May 1993) and UNIFIL I (March 1978 – August 2006), 
these periods are also briefly touched upon for the purpose of understanding the 
nature of the conflicts. In addition, Turkey’s and South Korea’s contributions to each 
operation will be discussed as a preparatory step for analyzing the decisive 
motivations of Turkey and South Korea for participating in the three peace 
operations.  
 
3.1. United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) 
3.1.1. General Information on UNOSOM II 
Following President Barre’s defeat in 1991, a civil war broke out between 
ethnically homogenous but genealogically different factions in Somalia -- those in 
favor of Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and those in favor of General 
Mohamed Farah Aidid --, especially in the capital Mogadishu. The civil war 
combined with a disastrous famine not only resulted in the deaths of more than 
 ３３ 
300,000 Somalis, but also caused a huge refugee problem and severe malnutrition of 
the majority of Somali population.67 In order to solve the conflict, UNOSOM I was 
established in April 1992 by UN SC Resolution 751.68 However, the UN mission had 
neither assumed any direct responsibility for finalizing the political impasse in 
Somalia, nor had enough capability to monitor ceasefire and to provide security for 
humanitarian works. The small number of initially assigned troops that were 
responsible for both monitoring the ceasefire and escorting deliveries of 
humanitarian supplies -- 50 military observers and just 500 infantry soldiers -- 
demonstrates the incapability of UNOSOM I.69 As the initial effort to relieve the 
deteriorated situation of Somalia deadlocked due to the continued fighting and 
insecurity, the UN SC adopted Resolution 794, which authorized UN member states 
to form the UNITAF.70 UNITAF was comprised of contingents from 24 countries led 
by the United States with 37,000 troops at its full strength and authorized to use all 
necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations 
in Somalia.71 UNITAF, which was in coordination with UNOSOM I, succeeded in 
opening up supply routes and made the flow of humanitarian aids possible.   
  Although UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in 
Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, it covered only 40 
percent of the entire territory and thus the insecure environment in Somalia had not 
yet disappeared completely. UN Security-General Boutros-Ghali kept insisting that 
UNITAF should have dealt with disarmament of the various factions in and around 
Mogadishu while adhering to a wider interpretation of “secure environment” for the 
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delivery of humanitarian assistance. Boutros-Ghali subsequently recommended the 
new UN-controlled operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II, be endowed with 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in order to establish a 
secure environment across Somalia.72 The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II 
was completed on 26 March 1993 with the adoption of UN SC Resolution 814. As 
the Secretary-General intended, UNOSOM II was mandated to disarm Somali 
militias by using force beyond self-defense if necessary. The main duties of 
UNOSOM II were: (1) monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation 
of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented; (2) preventing any 
resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action; (3) maintaining 
control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been 
brought under international control; (4) seizing the small arms of all unauthorized 
armed elements; (5) securing all ports, airports, and lines of communications 
required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (6) protecting the personnel, 
installations and equipment of the UN and its agencies, International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as NGOs; and (7) continuing mine-clearing, and to 
assist in repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.73 Furthermore, 
unlike UNITAF, UNOSOM II was placed under the direct control of the UN through 
the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Somalia and had 28,000 UN 
troops with reduced American presence.74    
The broadened mandate of UNOSOM II was considered a threat to the 
authority of the Somali factions, and consequently confrontation between UNOSOM 
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II and the warlords, especially General Aidid’s Somali National Alliance (SNA), 
became inevitable. A conspicuous example of the growing tension between the UN 
forces and the SNA was 24 Pakistani peacekeepers’ deaths in an attack in June 1993. 
Following the incident, the UN SC adopted Resolution 837, which blamed the SNA 
for inciting the attacks on Pakistani soldiers and authorized UNOSOM II to take all 
necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attack.75 From the day 
Resolution 837 was adopted, the situation in Somalia turned into a virtual war 
between UNOSOM II and the SNA as the two sides started attacking each other. 
Since the capture of General Aidid or his senior officials was beyond the capabilities 
of UNOSOM II forces, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of the United States, which 
was deployed in support of UNOSOM II, also began taking actions with the 
reinforcement of a strong 400-person Ranger task force.76 Despite the huge effort to 
eradicate the SNA, it remained unharmed and increased its retaliatory attacks on UN 
forces. On 3 October 1993, the SNA succeeded in inflicting serious casualties on US 
and UN personnel. In total, 1 Malaysian, 18 US soldiers were killed and 9 Malaysian, 
3 Pakistani, and 78 US soldiers were injured in an operation in Mogadishu.77 Forced 
by public outcry, President Clinton announced on 7 October that all US forces would 
be withdrawn from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Within a few days, the US decision 
to withdraw its troops was followed by other troop contributing states, such as 
Belgium, France and Sweden.78 UNOSOM II’s ability to provide security had been 
reduced by troop withdrawals and the UN’s effort to form an interim administration 
in Somalia ended with achieving no progress. Once the UN understood its inability 
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to urge factions to enact a ceasefire and form a unified government, the mission of 
UNOSOM II expired in March 1995, leaving behind a possibility of further famine 
in Somalia.79   
 
3.1.2. Turkey in UNOSOM II 
Following the UN SC decision to establish UNITAF in December 1992, 
Turkey received an invitation letter from the UN, in which it was requested to 
participate in the new US-led peace operation in Somalia. The invitation was 
examined by various governmental organizations and a decision allowing the 
dispatch of a mechanized company-sized contingent to Somalia was made after 
obtaining approval from the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 8 
December 1992.80 A small committee comprised of 9 personnel from the Chief of 
General Staff and Minister of Foreign Affairs was first sent to Somalia on 15 
December. The mission given to the committee was to assess the situation in Somalia 
and to carry out preliminary work related to the site and area of responsibility (AOR) 
of the Turkish contingent.81 On 19 December, two Turkish naval ships carrying the 
Turkish contingent departed from Mersin harbor and reached Mogadishu harbor after 
a 15-day trip. The Turkish contingent contributed to the operation in Somalia from 2 
January 1993 to 22 February 1994 (as part of UNITAF and then UNOSOM II) with a 
300-person mechanized company. 82  The main task assigned to the Turkish 
contingent was the protection of Mogadishu airport, which possessed the vital 
importance of connecting Somalia with the outside world.83  The other tasks the 
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Turkish troops carried out were to coordinate relief supplies, to protect UNOSOM II 
headquarters, to provide escorts for convoys, to facilitate security, and to ensure 
delivery of food to the Somali people. 
As the end of the one-year period allowed to the Turkish contingent in 
Somalia by the decision of TGNA approached and many contributing states 
(including the United States) declared their intentions to leave Somalia, Turkey also 
decided to withdraw its troops from Somalia in February 1994. The Turkish mission 
in Somalia was completed on 22 February 1994 with the return of its entire personnel 
and equipment to Turkey. What makes the operation in Somalia much more 
meaningful for Turkey is the fact that the command of UNOSOM II was assumed by 
a Turkish Lieutenant General. Following the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM 
II, General Çevik Bir became the first commander of UNOSOM II and performed his 
duty successfully from April 1993 to January 1994.            
 
3.1.3. South Korea in UNOSOM II 
South Korea did not send troops to UNITAF, but it provided financial 
support amounting to 2 million US dollars for the operation. When the transition 
from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was ongoing in the late January 1993, South Korea 
was asked by the Secretariat of the UN whether it could participate in UNOSOM II. 
After conducting an on-site inspection in Somalia and discussing the issue 3 times 
within the government, on 7 April 1993 South Korea informed the UN of its 
intention to participate in UNOSOM II with a 250-person engineering construction 
contingent.84 The bill on the dispatch of a South Korean engineering construction 
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contingent to Somalia was approved by the Cabinet on 15 April, and then by the 
National Assembly of South Korea on 18 May. The South Korean contingent, which 
was dubbed “Sangroksu Unit,” started its mission in Somalia on 31 July 1993.  It 
contributed to UNOSOM II for 8 months with 516 troops in total.85  
The South Korean contingent was deployed in Bal-ad district which is 
located 40 Km northeast of the capital city of Mogadishu. The main tasks assigned to 
it were to repair the road between Bal-ad and Jowhar, to set up a detour linking Bal-
ad to Afgooye in cooperation with the US contingent, and to re-open the “General 
Daud” irrigation canal.86 The South Korean contingent also conducted additional 
missions. These included missions such as developing clean water sources, repairing 
the airport, supporting other foreign contingents’ construction of barracks, and 
delivering drinking water to the Somali people. It also provided elementary school 
education to the Somali children who were left hopeless in the disastrous civil war 
and famine. In a school established by the South Korean troops, 18 teachers (14 
South Korean officers and 4 local teachers) taught Somali children Somali, English, 
mathematics, and music.87 UNOSOM II was the first peace operation in which the 
South Korean Armed forces ever participated. South Korea gained valuable 
experience and achieved self-confidence in conducting military tasks abroad through 
participation in UNOSOM II.   
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3.2. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon II (UNIFIL II) 
3.2.1. General Information on UNIFIL II 
As Palestinian armed elements relocated themselves from Jordan to 
Lebanon in the early 1970s, tension along the Israel-Lebanon border increased. In 
response to a commando attack on Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on 14 March 1978 and took control of the 
entire southern part of the state in a few days.88 Following the invasion, the UN 
called upon Israel’s immediate cessation of military action and withdrawal of its 
troops from Lebanese territories by adopting SC Resolutions 425 and 426 on 19 
March 1978. The creation of UNIFIL was also agreed on and it was mandated to 
confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore international peace and security, 
and to assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective 
authority in the area.89  When the Israeli-Lebanese war occurred in 1982, Israeli 
forces invaded Lebanon again and functions of UNIFIL were limited primarily to 
humanitarian assistance. Despite the UN’s continuous efforts of persuasion, Israel 
retained control of some territories in southern Lebanon until early 2000. On 17 
April 2000, Israel informed UN Secretary-General of its intention to withdraw all 
Israeli troops from the occupied zone by July 2000. Following the Israeli withdrawal, 
the situation in the area of the UNIFIL operation remained relatively tranquil and UN 
troops resumed their military functions in cooperation with Lebanese authorities.90  
However, new hostilities on the Israeli-Lebanese border, which started with 
Hezbollah’s rocket launching towards the Israeli forces on 12 July 2006, turned the 
calm situation into an armed conflict. A heavy exchange of fire ensued across the 
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UN-drawn Blue Line91 as Hezbollah targeted Israeli troop positions and towns, while 
Israel retaliated by ground, air, and sea attacks on Hezbollah positions within and 
around the UNIFIL area of operations. To end the conflict, which had caused the 
deaths of more than 1,300 people and the displacement of 300,000 residents92, the 
UN SC adopted Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006 and called for a full cessation of 
hostilities based on the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the 
immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations.93  The adoption of 
Resolution 1701 also made UNIFIL enter a totally different phase. An entirely new 
mission was created within the structure of the existing UNIFIL operation as its 
mandate, troop strength, troop configuration, and rules of engagement were radically 
revised.  
UNIFIL II was given six new tasks: (1) monitoring the cessation of 
hostilities; (2) accompanying Lebanese troops as they deploy throughout the South; 
(3) coordinating its activities with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel; (4) 
ensuring humanitarian access to civilians and the safe return of displaced persons; (5) 
assisting the Lebanese armed forces in undertaking their extensive responsibilities; 
and (6) assisting the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders.94 Although the 
new mandate given to UNIFIL II was positioned between Chapter VI and Chapter 
VII due to the intense resistance of the Lebanese, UNIFIL II was also allowed “to 
take all the necessary actions in areas of deployment of its force, and as it deems with 
its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities 
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of any kind.”95 In addition, operative paragraphs 11 and 12 of the new mandate, 
which left ample room for interpretation, made UNIFIL II’s indirect engagement 
with disarming Hezbollah possible through supporting and training the Lebanese 
forces.96  
UNIFIL II’s authorized troop strength was raised from 2,000 to 15,000 with 
the adoption of Resolution 1701. Currently, 12,133 uniformed personnel from 29 
states (both European and non-European states) are working for UNIFIL II, along 
with international and local civilian staffs.97 For the first time in the history of UN 
peace operations, the Maritime Task Force (MTF) was also included as part of 
UNIFIL II in October 2006. The role of MTF is to assist the Lebanese Naval Forces 
in preventing the smuggling of illegal and armament shipments. The MTF has been 
led by the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) since February 2008.98 
     
3.2.2. Turkey in UNIFIL II 
Since UN SC Resolution 1701 was adopted, Turkey has shown its 
willingness to contribute to UNIFIL II. On 28 August 2006, the Board of Ministers 
took a decision which not only allowed foreign troops headed for Lebanon to use 
Turkish airports and seaports, but also made Turkey’s contribution to UNIFIL II 
possible. On 5 September 2006, TGNA ratified Decision 880 and Turkey officially 
took a step forward to participate in UNIFIL II with troop commitment.99 As part of 
UNIFIL II ground operation, a Turkish engineering construction unit, which is 
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located in Eş Şaatiye (about 8 km east of Sur city), has been conducting its mission 
in Lebanon since 20 October 2006. So far, a total of 237 military personnel and 24 
civilian officials have been working in the Turkish unit.100 In addition, within the 
framework of UNIFIL II MTF, 4 Turkish naval ships -- 1 frigate (since 15 October 
2007), 1 underway replenishment vessel (since 17 March 2008), and 2 corvettes 
(since 25 April 2008) -- have been carrying out their missions.       
Turkey contributes to UNIFIL II in four ways: (1) patrolling the coast of 
the East Mediterranean Sea; (2) supporting other contributing countries in air and sea 
transportation with a condition of pre-examination; (3) providing military trainings to 
the Lebanese Armed Forces; and (4) conducting humanitarian activities.101 TGNA 
has extended the one-year period for the deployment of Turkish troops in Lebanon 3 
times since its first approval.102 As one of a few Muslim countries participating in 
UNIFIL II, Turkey is currently playing an active role in bringing a peaceful solution 
to the crisis in Lebanon.     
 
3.2.3. South Korea in UNIFIL II 
When the UN signaled the start of UNIFIL II by adopting SC Resolution 
1701 and officially requested the international community’s shared role and 
contribution, the South Korean government decided to send troops to the new 
operation. A bill on the dispatch of 350 infantry troops to UNIFIL II was drawn up 
and then passed by the Cabinet on 28 November 2006. On 22 December, the bill 
entered into effect with the approval of the National Assembly. The South Korean 
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contingent, which was dubbed “Dongmyung Unit,” started its first mission in 
Lebanon on 19 July 2007.103 It was deployed in Tyre, which is one of Lebanon’s 
largest cities and serves as the core supply port to UNIFIL II, as a sub-battalion of 
the Western Brigade. So far, a total of 1,681 South Korean personnel have 
contributed to UNIFIL II with a 6-month rotation system.104  
The South Korean contingent has been carrying out various missions in 
Lebanon. It successfully conducted the surveillance-reconnaissance mission over 
5,000 times and prevented armed militants’ infiltration into its own AOR. In addition, 
it executed the collaborated mission with Lebanese troops over 2,700 times and 
contributed to the improvement of Lebanese troops’ operational abilities.105 Under 
the code name “Peace Wave,” the South Korean contingent is also conducting its 
own civil operation for Lebanese people. The “Peace Wave” is composed of two 
main parts, medical service and project for local inhabitants.106 More than 14,000 
patients have received medical service from the South Korean traveling clinic. In 
addition, as part of project for local inhabitants, a gymnasium was built and two 
educational schools were opened. As the extension bill for the South Korean 
contingent in Lebanon was passed in the National Assembly on 15 July 2009, the 
South Korean contingent is expected to carry out its mission in Lebanon until late 
2010.107 UNIFIL II is South Korea’s fifth UN mission (except observing missions) 
and second mission involving combat units. 
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3.3. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
3.3.1. General Information on ISAF 
In response to the unprecedented terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda upon the 
United States on 11 September 2001, the US-led military operation or Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched on the basis of self-defense of the UN 
Charter to eliminate Al-Qaeda, to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and to 
prevent the emergence of other terrorist organizations. In parallel with OEF, the UN 
condemned the terrorist attacks and recognized the need to establish a transitional 
administration in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban regime. As a result, 
the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was created following the Bonn Treaty on 5 
December 2001.108  In addition, as requested in the treaty, ISAF was established with 
UN SC Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001 to maintain the security in Kabul and 
its surrounding areas, so that the AIA as well as the personnel of the UN could 
operate in a secure environment.109 ISAF was given a peace-enforcement mandate 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and was not a UN mission, but a UN-
authorized mission funded by the troop contributors.110   
From ISAF I to ISAF III (1 December 2001 – 3 August 2003), its mission 
had been carried out by volunteer individual nations with a 6-month rotation 
system.111 On 11 August 2003, NATO took over the command and coordination of 
ISAF and brought the rotation system to an end by overcoming the problem of a 
continual search to find new leading nations and the difficulties of setting up a new 
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headquarters every six months.112 Although the initial mandate of ISAF was limited 
to the region of Kabul, the adoption of UN SC Resolution 1510 on 13 October 2003 
paved the way for an expansion of the ISAF mission. The resolution requested ISAF 
to help the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) in maintaining security of the entire 
Afghanistan beyond Kabul and to provide a secure environment for other 
international civilian personnel engaged in reconstruction and humanitarian 
efforts.113 Following the adoption of UN SC Resolution 1510, the troop deployment 
of ISAF evolved. ISAF gradually took command over other regions from OEF. Stage 
1 of the scheduled expansion, which was initiated on 31 December 2003, expanded 
ISAF’s area of operations to cover the North of Afghanistan. Stage 2 and 3 allowed 
ISAF to provide security assistance in the West and the South, respectively. After 
Stage 4, which was completed on 5 October 2006 by expanding ISAF’s AOR 
towards the East, ISAF finally covered the whole of Afghanistan. 114  
In the UN SC Resolution 1776 of 2007, ISAF was given a new additional 
mission, which was to sustain its efforts to train, mentor, and empower the Afghan 
National Security Force (ANSF), in particular the Afghan National Police (ANP).115 
Currently, ISAF is carrying out four general missions for the purpose of assisting the 
Afghan authorities in providing security and stability and creating the conditions for 
reconstruction and development. These are: (1) security-related missions: (a) 
conducting security and stability operations, (b) supporting the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and ANP, (c) disarming illegally armed groups, (d) facilitating 
ammunition depots managements, and (e) providing post-operation assistance; (2) 
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reconstruction and development-related missions through the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): (a) providing security to permit reconstruction, and 
(b) humanitarian assistance; (3) governance through PRTs; and (4) counter-
narcotics.116 
ISAF structure is composed of Regional Command Capital (HQ ISAF and 
HQ RC), Regional Command South (4 PRTs), Regional Command West (4 PRTs), 
Regional Command North (5 PRTs), and Regional Command East (13 PRTs).117 As 
of December 2009, ISAF had 84,150 troops from 43 nations.118 Its troop numbers are 
to be increased, as US President Obama pledged the deployment of an additional 
30,000 US troops to Afghanistan to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and stabilize 
the government of Afghanistan.119 The ultimate goal of ISAF is to hand over lead 
responsibility for security to ANSF as reaffirmed by the NATO Secretary-General 
Rasmussen in the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010.120      
 
3.3.2. Turkey in ISAF 
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Turkey quickly gave 
its full support to the US military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan and agreed to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty along with 
the other NATO members. A bill authorizing the Turkish government to contribute 
troops to the US military campaign was passed in TGNA in October 2001. The bill 
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also permitted the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish territories and the use of 
Turkish airspace and airbases. Initially, Turkey sent a unit of Special Forces to 
Afghanistan in order to help American troops conduct humanitarian operations and 
train Northern Alliance fighters.121 When ISAF started in December 2001, Turkey 
decided to take part in the operation. Turkey contributed to ISAF I by sending an 
infantry company composed of 267 soldiers. The Turkish company, which was 
deployed in Kabul, carried out security patrols and humanitarian aid. 
 When the British leadership of ISAF I came to an end, Turkey decided to 
play a leading role in ISAF II on 29 April 2002. Following the decision, Turkey 
increased its contribution to the battalion-level task force with approximately 1,300 
troops.122 During the period of ISAF II (20 June 2002 – 10 February 2003), Turkish 
Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu commanded the international force, which was 
composed of 4,800 personnel from 22 countries, and Turkish troops took charge of 
the Kabul International Airport and the Multinational Headquarters. 123  On 10 
February 2003, Turkey handed over its 8-month ISAF II leadership to the joint 
command of Germany and the Netherlands. Turkey’s participation continued after 
the end of ISAF II with a decreased number of troops. Between ISAF III and ISAF V 
(February 2003 – August 2004), Turkey participated in the operation with 300 troops 
and provided 3 helicopters for medical evacuation and reconnaissance purposes. 
When the command and coordination of ISAF was placed under NATO, 
Turkey showed its leadership in ISAF again. NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey 
(NRDC-T) assumed the leadership of ISAF VII, and Turkish troop presence in 
Afghanistan was increased from 240 (including 23 Azerbaijani and 23 Albanian 
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troops) to 1,500 personnel.124 During the period of ISAF VII (13 February 2005 – 4 
August 2005), the Turkish 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade served as the Kabul 
Multinational Brigade and a Turkish unit ran the Kabul International Airport. Turkey 
also established a PRT in Wardak province, which is located approximately 40 km 
west of Kabul, in November 2006. In the Wardak PRT, Turkish civilian and military 
personnel have worked together to achieve 3 main goals: (1) developing 
administrative and judiciary systems; (2) training the Afghan Police Force; and (3) 
conducting activities aimed to improve and support infrastructure, public works, and 
social support to raise the life quality of the local population.125 
Currently, Turkey is responsible for administering the Headquarters of 
Regional Command Capital Kabul with a 1,755 troop presence in Afghanistan.126 In 
addition, Turkey is planning to establish another PRT in Jawzjan province and to 
rebuild the Kabul Military High School. 127  Turkey conducts its mission in 
Afghanistan, keeping itself from engaging in any combat operations. Even when the 
reduction of national caveats was requested by several key NATO members in the 
Riga summit in October 2006, Turkey refused to change its restriction on the use of 
force in combat. 128  Turkey’s firm stance of distancing itself from any combat 
operation in Afghanistan is well revealed in a statement by Ahmet Davutoglu, 
                                               
124
 Sabah Newspaper. 2005. ‘Afganistan’da Komuta Yeniden Türkiyenin (The Command in 
Afghanistan is assumed by Turkey again),’ available at: 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/muderrisoglu/2004/05/21/Afganistan_da_komuta_yeniden_Turkiye
_nin 
125
 Turkish General Staff. 2010. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation, available 
at: http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm 
126
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2010. International Security Assistance Force 
and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown, 1 February, available at 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf 
127
 Sabah Newspaper. 2009. ‘Kabil’de Komutanlık Türkiye’ye geçiyor (The Command in Kabul is 
transferred to Turkey’ 1 November, available at: 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Dunya/2009/11/01/kbilde_komutanlik_turkiyeye_geciyor 
128
 In response to the request, France changed its national caveat and agreed to allow its forces in 
Kabul and elsewhere to come to the assistance of other NATO forces in an emergency. Italy and Spain 
left the decision of sending forces to assist in an urgent situation to their force commanders in the field. 
See, Gallis, Paul. 2007. “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,” CRS Report 
for Congress, Code RL33627: 13 
 ４９ 
current Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in 
December 2009, he said, “There is no plan to send Turkish combat troops to 
Afghanistan. However, it is possible to consider sending military instructors for 
training the Afghan Armed Forces.”129  
 
3.3.3. South Korea in ISAF 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the South Korean government decided 
to join the international campaign of solidarity for supporting the US attempt to 
eradicate terrorism. The bill on sending troops to Afghanistan was submitted to the 
National Assembly for approval and adopted on 6 December 2001.130 Initially, 1 
naval vessel and 4 C-130 aircrafts were sent to assist the American troops in 
transporting personnel and supplies. In late 2002, South Korea additionally sent one 
medical unit (called “Dongui”) and one engineering construction unit (called 
“Dasan”) to Afghanistan for humanitarian purposes. The medical unit opened a 
hospital in the Bagram base, which is located 40 km north of Kabul, and provided 
surgical treatments for local Afghans and foreign troops. For five years, the South 
Korean medical unit treated more than 260,000 personnel, gave 63 health training, 
and conducted 36 relief activities with 780 troops in total. 131  The engineering 
construction unit conducted various missions, such as the restoration of local 
infrastructure, the construction of military bases for foreign troops, and job training 
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for the Afghan people, with 1,360 troops in total.132 In addition, South Korea led the 
Parwan PRT in cooperation with the United States.133   
In December 2007, South Korea withdrew its troops from Afghanistan 
following the Taliban’s kidnapping of 21 South Koreans on 19 July.134 However, it 
did not stop its contribution to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. A South 
Korean reconstruction team comprised of 30 personnel from government officials, 
civilian medical personnel, and civilian experts on job training, remained in 
Afghanistan and continued to support the rehabilitation effort of the Afghan 
people. 135  Recently, the South Korean government has decided to expand its 
contribution to Afghanistan so as to meet the Afghan government’s constant requests. 
On 8 December 2009, the Cabinet finalized the bill on dispatching troops to 
Afghanistan. The bill includes the establishment of a PRT, which is comprised of 
100 civilians and 40 police officers, in Parwan province and the dispatch of 350 
troops for the protection of the PRT personnel.136 With the final approval of the 
National Assembly on 25 February 2010, South Korea got down to the preparation 
for troop commitments to ISAF, with the aim of fully starting its missions in 
Afghanistan by July 2010 at the latest. The prospective South Korean contingent will 
assume the tasks for improving the ability of provincial administration, providing 
medical service, developing agricultural infrastructure, and training the Afghan 
police. The prospective South Korean contingent will be placed under ISAF 
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Regional Command East for a two-and-a-half-year period. 137  Tae-Young Kim, 
Minister of National Defense, clearly revealed the purpose of the new mission by 
saying, “This dispatch is not for conducting combat operations, but for ensuring a 
secure environment in which our PRT can play its reconstructing role without any 
risk.”138     
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ANALYSIS OF TURKEY’S AND SOUTH KOREA’S 
MOTIVATIONS 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the motivations of Turkey and South Korea will be analyzed. 
Special attention will be given to examining the actual impact of the four probable 
motivations of the “allied new middle powers” -- indirect security concerns (or US 
pressure); the domestic factor (public opinion); potential economic benefit; and 
ideational considerations -- on the two states’ decisions to send troops to Somalia, 
Lebanon, and Afghanistan, respectively. Since it is not possible to analyze a state’s 
motivations without knowing the state’s internal and external situations, Turkey’s 
and South Korea’s political, economic, and security situations, especially those 
relevant to the analysis, will be briefly touched upon at the beginning of every sub-
section. After analyzing the motivations of Turkey and South Korea on a case-by-
case basis, combined results of the whole analyses will be suggested at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
 4.1. Motivations for Sending Troops to UNOSOM II 
4.1.1. Turkey’s Motivations  
Turkey’s decision to send troops to Somalia occurred not long after the end 
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of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Turkey enjoyed the privileged status of being 
a NATO member by directly containing the Soviet Union in the immediate proximity. 
Turkey’s place in the West was not a topic of controversy, since its geo-strategic 
importance was highly valued by the United States and other NATO members. When 
the Cold War came to an end, however, Turkey became seized with the possibility 
that its geo-strategic importance would be marginalized in the new era. Turkish 
authorities were concerned that a decrease in Turkey’s geo-strategic importance 
would likely cause a reduction in Western economic and military assistance and an 
increase in Western pressure concerning Cyprus and human right issues.139 Losing 
geo-strategic importance, which conveyed the same meaning of staying outside the 
Western structure, was by no means acceptable for Turkey. The outbreak of the Gulf 
War in August 1990 provided Turkey with a good opportunity to alleviate this 
concern. By playing a significant role in the US-led international coalition against 
Iraq, Turkey proved that it was still a reliable ally of the West and an indispensable 
partner for protecting Western interests in the Middle East.140 
At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia in early 1992 caused Turkey to turn its attention to 
much broader regions. During the Cold War, Turkey had almost no relation with 
Central Asia and the Caucasus despite common ethnic and cultural ties.141 Turkey’s 
approach to the Balkans was also limited in some specific issues, such as the security 
challenge posed by the Warsaw Pact, and the treatment of the ethnic Turkish 
minorities in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania. 142  However, the 
emergence of the new Turkic republics (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the 
independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (where Turkish minorities and 
Muslim populations were living) in the Balkans created a hope that Turkey could 
expand its role and influence in these territories. In the early 1990s, Turkey was 
aiming to increase its political and economic influence in multiple regions through 
the newly adopted activist and assertive foreign policy.143 
It is not possible to explain Turkey’s participation in UNOSOM II 
separately from the consecutive developments of Turkish foreign policy orientation 
in the initial stage of the post-Cold War era. This is mainly because other motivating 
factors like public opinion and economic gains were less influential. Although 
Somalia had been a region of the Habesh province of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
majority of its population were Muslims, the crisis in Somalia did not attract much 
Turkish public attention in late 1992. The primary issue in which the Turkish people 
were interested was rather the crisis in Bosnia, where the Serbian ethnic cleansing 
policy towards the Bosnian Muslims was ongoing. The Turkish people’s little 
attention to the crisis in Somalia at that time is well revealed in the statement by 
Engin Güner who was a member of TGNA from the Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi-ANAP):   
For a couple of months, we have mentioned about the tragedy, ethnic cleansing, 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, and displacement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These are the main topics of TV, radio, and other publications in 
these days. Now, we received a governmental bill on Somalia. It is very difficult 
to explain this bill to the public…How many people in Turkey know Somalia 
and follow the conflict there? But, if you ask anyone in the streets where a 
massacre is occurring, where a crime against humanity is happening, and where 
an ethnic cleansing is being implemented, the answer will be clear, Bosnia-
Herzegovina.144          
 
As there was no public opinion which could sufficiently prompt the Turkish 
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government to take action concerning the crisis in Somalia, receiving economic 
benefits from participation in UNOSOM II was not a predominant consideration 
either. Somalia was one of the world’s poorest and least developed countries in 1992. 
For Turkey, not just Somalia, but all African countries, were out of economic 
consideration. Indeed, Turkey’s economic relations with Africa between 1923 and 
1998 were at their lowest level, which cannot be said to exist at all.145 General Çevik 
Bir also explained the unreadiness of the Turkish government to create economic 
profits by taking advantage of his assignment to the post of UNOSOM II commander. 
He said, “It might be possible to get some economic advantages from my 
commander position …Turkish food and pharmaceutical industries were capable of 
providing the necessities in Somalia…However, to put forward this topic was not a 
responsibility of military, but a responsibility of related ministry.”146    
One crucial motivating factor for Turkey’s decision to dispatch troops to 
Somalia was to show its willingness to contribute to any international humanitarian 
movement so as to facilitate its participation in the UN activities in the Balkans, 
especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Turkey was eager to bring a peaceful solution to the crisis due in part 
to the likelihood that the crisis could undermine regional stability and spill over into 
Turkey, and mostly to the presence of a large number of Turks of Balkan origin in 
Turkey.147 As the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina further deteriorated and the public 
demand for the fulfillment of moral responsibilities towards the Bosnian Muslims 
increased in late 1992, the Turkish government was seeking a strengthened 
multilateral response to end Serbian atrocities. Turkey did not intend to take any 
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unilateral action, since such action might be perceived as the pursuance of 
irredentism towards former Ottoman territories and would damage its relations with 
Western allies.148 At such a moment, Turkey’s contribution to the UN humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia could help not only change the pessimistic attitude of the 
United States and the European states towards using military force against the Serbs, 
but also justify its active action towards the Balkans within the international context. 
This motivation is expressed in the statement by Hikmet Çetin, then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, during the parliamentary discussion on the dispatch bill on 8 
December 1992:   
From the beginning, the Republic of Turkey has been saying that the UN should 
intervene in the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and trying to get it done. In every 
international conference and bilateral meeting, the primary issue has been 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Karabağ for the President, the Prime Minister, and the 
whole government officials including myself…The only thing required is for 
the UN and the world not to use double standards. We believe that as there was 
intervention in Iraq and as there is now intervention in Somalia, there should be 
intervention in Sarajevo in the same way despite difficulties…This (the UN 
intervention in Somalia) gives a strong justification for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The decision for Somalia can be a powerful justification against those who keep 
saying “The crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an intra-state problem, it is 
necessary to keep away from such domestic problems.” It is probable that, even 
if with humanitarian purpose, the UN Security Council will intervene by 
sending forces.149          
 
The other crucial motivating factor for Turkey was to demonstrate itself as 
a model state in the new era. In the early 1990s, Turkey was regarded by various 
Turkish elites, and by foreign scholars as a model of a democratic, secular, free-
market society, which would be suitable for the newly independent states in Central 
Europe and Central Asia.150 The ultimate foreign policy goal of Turkey during the 
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tenure of President Özal (1989 – 1993) was to project the Turkish model with the 
support of the United States so as to step forward as the leading actor in a Turkic 
world stretching from the Adriatic to the great Chinese wall.151 Somalia constituted a 
good arena for Turkey to show its ability to play an international role. Turkey’s 
successful performance in Somalia would increase its national prestige and 
consequently enhance the acceptability of the Turkish model. General Çevik Bir 
revealed this perspective in his book A Hope for Somalia: 
My assignment to the UN commander would add prestige to our country in the 
international arena. At that time, Turkish Republics that shared common ties in 
terms of history, culture, religion, and language were newly emerging as 
independent states. The positive situation that had been made through the strong 
ties with them would continue to develop in our favor with Turkey’s UNOSOM 
II commander position.152       
 
Turkish authorities’ intentions to augment Turkey’s international role through 
sending troops to Somalia can also be found in the answer that Süleyman Demirel, 
then Prime Minister, gave during a press interview on 7 December 1992. When 
asked about Turkey’s decision to send troops to Somalia, he said, “If you want 
Turkey to become a world state, you should not say, ‘What are our interests at stake 
there?’.”153        
To summarize Turkey’s motivations for sending troops to Somalia, 
facilitating Turkey’s participation in the UN activities in the Balkans and 
demonstrating the Turkish model in the new era can be counted as the actual decisive 
motivations. In addition, public opinion and economic considerations had little 
impact on the decision. Indirect security concerns had also little to do with Turkey’s 
decision to participate in UNOSOM II, because it was Turkey that needed the United 
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States by its side for pursuing the activist and assertive foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era.  
4.1.2. South Korea’s Motivations 
The advent of the post-Cold War era brought a reconciliatory mood to the 
Korean peninsula that had invariably been a hot spot of ideological and military 
confrontation for four decades. South Korea’s ambitious “Northern Policy,” which 
was launched in the late 1980s with the aim of normalizing its relations with socialist 
regimes, produced good results, such as the start of diplomatic relations with 
Moscow (1990) and Beijing (1992).154 South Korea also intended to ease the hostile 
rivalry with North Korea through increased trade and inter-Korean communication. 
South Korea’s efforts to alleviate the tension resulted in immediate positive 
outcomes. The first high-level talk between South and North Korean prime ministers 
took place in September 1990. South Korea and North Korea finally entered the UN 
as two separate but equal member states on 17 September 1991.155 The two Koreas 
also successfully negotiated the agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and 
exchanges and cooperation on 13 December 1991 and consequently adopted the joint 
declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula on 31 December 1991.156 
The atmosphere of the inter-Korean rapprochement went on until 19 March 1993, 
when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). The event radically changed the expectation for peace in the Korean 
peninsula from optimism to pessimism. The two Koreas were pushed to the brink of 
war as North Korea played a brinkmanship policy by resisting international pressure 
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for nuclear inspection.  
The South Korean government’s final decision to participate in UNOSOM 
II (April 1993) chronologically follows the beginning of the nuclear standoff on the 
Korean peninsula (March 1993). However, the security concern emanating from the 
North Korean nuclear program had no impact on South Korea’s decision to send 
troops to Somalia. A few days after South Korea became an official member of the 
UN in September 1991, it received the UN questionnaire asking to what extent South 
Korea can send troops to UN peace operations. After a one-year discussion, the 
South Korean government informed the UN on 18 September 1992 that it could 
contribute to UN peace operations within the purview of 540 infantry troops, 36 
military observers, and 174 military medical personnel.157 In October 1992, the UN 
requested that the South Korean government send a medical unit comprised of 70 
personnel to UNOSOM I through an unofficial route, but the South Korean 
government rejected the request. The decision to reject was because it thought its 
preparation for peace operations was not sufficient and, more importantly, it had long 
been hoping for Cambodia to become its first UN peace operation area. 158  In 
December 1992, the UN once again requested South Korea’s troop contribution and 
financial support for UNITAF. In response to the request, the South Korean 
government decided not to send troops, but to provide 2 million US dollars for the 
operation. In January 1993, when the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was 
ongoing in Somalia, the UN requested South Korea’s troop commitment for the third 
time. This time, the South Korean government took a positive attitude towards the 
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request and made a provisional decision in February 1993 to send troops to 
UNOSOM II.159 As revealed above, all the consecutive processes paving the way for 
the South Korean government’s final decision to send troops to Somalia had 
happened before the inter-Korean relations started moving in a negative direction. 
This fact implies that indirect security concerns or potential weakening of its military 
alliance with the United States were not  crucial motivating factors for South Korea’s 
participation in UNOSOM II. The South Korean government’s refusal to send troops 
to UNITAF despite the request of President Bush and its turning down the request of 
President Clinton to send combat troops to UNOSOM II also confirm that indirect 
security concerns were not a powerful motivation.160   
In addition, the impact of public opinion and economic consideration on 
South Korea’s decision was very marginal. When the South Korean government set 
up the basic principles of sending troops to peace operations in 1992, South Koreans 
generally had negative attitudes towards the participation in any peace operation due 
mostly to the experience of severe casualties in the Vietnam War. In the course of 
considering the participation in UNOSOM II, South Korean public opinion did not 
shift. The South Korean diplomats working in the UN headquarters said, “PKO has a 
low level of risk because its missions are limited to monitoring elections and 
delivering humanitarian aids. However, we have difficulties with respect to the topic 
of sending troops to Somalia, since there is a widespread public perception in South 
Korea of regarding PKO in the same light as the Vietnam War.”161 When it comes to 
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economic considerations, the South Korean government did not aim to get economic 
benefits from participating in UNOSOM II. Although South Korea established 
diplomatic relations with Somalia in 1987, South Korean companies did not show 
any enthusiasm to invest in Somalia. When the security situation of Somalia further 
deteriorated in early 1992, South Korea closed down its embassy in Mogadishu. 
From 1993 to 2003, South Korea had no diplomatic relations with Somalia at all.162 
Furthermore, South Korea’s annual trade volume with Somalia stayed around $ 1.5 
million, a very small amount of money, even after the completion of UNOSOM II.163 
This fact confirms that South Korea did not have any design to make use of its 
contribution to Somalia for creating potential economic profits.  
One of the most decisive motivations of South Korea was to quickly elevate 
its position in the UN. South Korea’s attempt to gain UN membership started in 1949. 
However, the superpower rivalry in the Cold War era and North Korea’s constant 
objection to the parallel membership for the two Koreas delayed its admission for 42 
years.164 Since South Korea placed 30th in terms of per-capita income and 13th in 
terms of gross national product (GNP) by the end of 1980s, it targeted the very first 
day of its UN membership to make its position in the UN commensurate with its 
already reached high economic level. The participation in UNOSOM II constituted a 
good opportunity for South Korea to reach its goal more quickly. When the South 
Korean government started to take active steps towards its troop commitment to 
Somalia, the spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “The basic stance of the 
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government is that South Korea should actively take part in the UN effort to keep 
international peace and security, so as to enhance its status in the UN and to 
strengthen its cooperation with other member states.”165 South Korea’s intention to 
exalt its position in the UN through sending troops to Somalia is also expressed in 
the Evaluation Report of the Bill on the Dispatch of a South Korean Engineering 
Contingent to UNOSOM II: 
This bill is for participating in UN peacekeeping activities within the limits of 
possibility as a member of the UN. The participation in UNOSOM II is thought 
to be a good opportunity, since it is consistent with the spirit of our constitution 
claiming to advocate pacifism; it will make our people feel a sense of pride and 
self-confidence; and it will be a way to accumulate our records of contributing 
to constructive activities and to the international community, which is essential 
for securing a position befitting our international status in the UN…By sending 
an engineering contingent to Somalia, we expect to make our international 
status enhanced and to create a likely circumstance for getting international 
assistance in case of emergency.166  
 
South Korea’s decision to send troops to Somalia had also much to do with 
the “New Diplomacy.” With the election of Young-Sam Kim as President in 
December 1992, a new civilian government was formed in South Korea that ended 
32 years of military regimes. The new government laid out a blueprint South Korea 
should follow in the new era under the title of the “New Diplomacy.” The “New 
Diplomacy” was a diplomacy emphasizing universal values of democracy, liberty, 
welfare, and human rights. It also had five fundamental principles, namely, globalism, 
diversification, multidimensionalism, regional cooperation, and future orientation.167 
Through pursuing the “New Diplomacy,” the new government aimed not only to 
raise South Korea’s international competitiveness, but also to take a step forward in 
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playing a central role in the international arena. The decision to participate in 
UNOSOM II was an outcome of the new South Korean government’s early drive 
towards globalization in the post-Cold War era. Sung-Joo Han, the first Foreign 
Minister of President Young-Sam Kim’s administration and one of the key 
architectures of the “New Diplomacy,”  said, “We will take an active part in 
international efforts to tackle global issues…We will contribute to UN peacekeeping 
operations and international peace and security, thereby also securing our place in the 
international community.” 168  In addition, Deputy Foreign Minister Soon-Young 
Hong’s answer with respect to the participation in UNOSOM II at the Committee of 
Foreign Affairs and Unification on 13 May 1993 clearly shows the new South 
Korean government’s aspirations for a more active role in the international arena:    
Many members of the National Assembly have asked why we should send 
troops to Somalia and why we should engage in every conflict whenever it 
occurs. In fact, one of the most noteworthy changes in the aftermath of the Cold 
War is the strengthened role of the UN in the international arena, and then 
comes the strengthened function of PKO activities. It is necessary for us to 
actively participate in PKO activities as a responsible member of the 
international community. We should assume a key role in maintaining the new 
international order and contribute to further strengthening of PKO activities.169  
 
To summarize South Korea’s motivations for sending troops to Somalia, 
quickly exalting its position in the UN and playing a central role in the international 
arena through pursuing the “New Diplomacy” can be counted as the actual decisive 
motivations. In addition, it is hard to regard indirect security concerns as a decisive 
motivation, since all the consecutive processes leading to the South Koran 
government’s final decision to participate in UNOSOM II occurred at the time of 
reconciliation between the two Koreas. Public opinion and economic consideration 
had also little impact on the decision. 
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4.2. Motivations for Sending Troops to UNIFIL II 
4.2.1. Turkey’s Motivations 
From the outbreak of the armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 
July 2006, Turkey attentively followed the evolution of events in Lebanon. On 15 
July, Turkey called for an immediate ceasefire in the region. Abdullah Gül, then 
Foreign Minister, said, “We invite everyone to ceasefire quickly. If a ceasefire is 
delayed, we will see the risk of escalation and the complete destruction of the 
opportunity for co-existence.”170 Turkey also devoted itself to end the tension that 
could negatively affect the entire world through all of its bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic channels. When the deployment of a stabilization force in southern 
Lebanon began to be discussed among UN diplomats, many news reports and experts 
mentioned Turkey as one of the possible leading nations for the force. Turkey 
approached the issue with discretion as it set certain terms for its final decision. The 
terms were: (1) the adoption of a UN resolution; (2) non-involvement in any combat 
mission (including the disarmament of Hezbollah) by the international force; and (3) 
the announcement by all the parties to the conflict welcoming Turkey’s 
participation.171 In an interview with CNN on 27 July, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan said, “Turkey may take part in a Lebanon peace force only after the 
realization of a ceasefire.”172 Even after the UN SC unanimously adopted Resolution 
1701 on 11 August, Turkey remained cautious about its troop commitments. On 14 
August, the Turkish government signaled that it would suspend its formal decision 
until the UN SC approved a new decision clarifying the mandate of the planned troop 
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deployment. It was only after the Foreign Minister Gül’s fact-finding mission for 
gathering opinions from Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and Syria that the Turkish 
government finally completed its long pondering on whether to send troops to 
Lebanon. On 28 August, government spokesperson and Justice Minister Cemil Çiçek 
said, “The UN peace force issue was discussed and it was decided in principle that 
we would participate in the mission.”173  
The issue of sending troops to Lebanon created a huge wave of opposition 
in Turkey’s domestic arena. The majority of the Turkish people did not favor the 
government’s decision to participate in UNIFIL II. More than 100,000 Turks who 
were outraged by Israeli strikes on Lebanon joined the anti-war demonstration in 
Istanbul.174 Furthermore, the results of an internet poll conducted by major Turkish 
newspapers right before the parliamentary vote showed that public opinion in Turkey 
was strongly against the decision (Hürriyet: 76.8% / Milliyet: 84% /  Sabah: 
69.66%).175 Ahmet Necdet Sezer, President of the time, was also among those who 
opposed the idea of sending troops. He took a strong stance against the decision by 
saying, “I keep saying everywhere. We do not have to protect other states’ national 
interests. It is not our duty to solve other states’ security problems. Under the 
circumstance that we have our own problem, it is not our responsibility to deal with 
that of others.”176 Even many deputies of the ruling Justice and Development Party 
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(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) disagreed with sending troops to Lebanon.177 
Hence, it can be said that the Turkish government’s decision to participate in 
UNIFIL II was not a result of any domestic pressure. 
The Turkish government’s decision was not affected by US pressure, in 
other words, indirect security concerns were not a decisive motivating factor for 
Turkey. From the beginning, Turkey unchangingly argued that a ceasefire should be 
maintained before the deployment of a possible stabilization force in Lebanon and 
favored the force under the UN flag, whereas the United States resisted calling for an 
immediate ceasefire and wanted NATO to assume the leadership of the force. To the 
disappointment of many US officials, Turkey declined to take a critical stand on 
Hezbollah and officially blamed Israel for indiscriminate and disproportionate 
retaliation. In addition, Turkey was staunchly opposed to the idea proposed by the 
United States that UNIFIL II should have the authority to fight Hezbollah if needed. 
The Turkish government publicly declared that it would participate only in 
humanitarian missions at a time when the United States was seeking a new UN 
decision to give UNIFIL II the clear task of disarming Hezbollah. 178  Turkey’s 
dissatisfaction with the US stance on the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 
the same period simply drops US pressure as one of the main motivations. When the 
PKK terrorist campaign in the southeastern region of Turkey mounted in mid-July, 
the Turkish government issued a strong call on the United States to do something 
about the PKK presence in northern Iraq and warned that it could otherwise engage 
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in cross-border military action unilaterally.179 Several Turkish officials also criticized 
the United States for tolerating Israel’s attacks on its enemies in Lebanon while 
refusing to allow Turkey to crush the PKK terrorists hiding inside northern Iraq. 
Although the Bush administration pledged better cooperation in the fight against the 
PKK following the Turkish government’s firm signal of intervening in northern Iraq, 
Turkish leaders continued to demand more concrete US actions against the PKK.180 
In short, it can be said that the Turkish government followed a separate track 
independent of the United States with respect to UNIFIL II. 
It is true that Turkey’s participation in UNIFIL II helped to improve its 
economic relations with Lebanon. As shown in Table 3, Turkey’s exports to Lebanon 
have rapidly increased since 2006. In addition, Turkey placed 8th in the list of 
Lebanon’s 10 largest trading partners for the first time in 2007. According to Veysel 
Ayhan, Turkey’s willingness to participate in UNIFIL II and its humanitarian aid in 
Lebanon were the two important elements in the upgraded relations between Turkey  
 
Table 3. Economic Relation between Turkey and Lebanon (2005–2008)181 
Turkey–Lebanon Annual Trade (1000 $) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Turkey’s Exports to Lebanon 199,641 257,826 405,096 698,529 
Turkey’s Imports from Lebanon 121,600 102,345 109,577 206,863 
Total Trade Volume 321,241 360,171 514,673 905,392 
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and Lebanon in the fields of economy, politics, and security.182 The economic indices 
imply that the Turkish government might have been motivated by potential economic  
benefits achievable from participation in UNIFIL II. However, it is somewhat 
unclear since there was not any comment on the economic dimension by any Turkish 
officials during the decision-making process. Thus, it is more correct to say that 
economic benefits gained from Lebanon since 2006 was rather a natural consequence 
of Turkey’s increased role as a third party in the Middle East. This fact leads us to 
one of the crucial motivations behind Turkey’s decision to participate in UNIFIL II.   
  One crucial motivation of Turkey, as hinted above, was to increase its 
ability as a credible mediator in the Middle East, that is, to show itself as a core soft 
power in the region. Turkey has been regarded as a state possessing the potential to 
become a soft power, thanks to its uniqueness that combines Muslim, secular, and 
democratic characteristics in harmony. Turkey’s considerable achievement in 
socioeconomic and political fields also helped it to be perceived as a soft power by 
many Muslim states. The AKP party’s coming to power in 2002 further increased 
Turkey’s appeal as a soft power, as it revealed the possibility of moderate Islam and 
its compatibility with democracy.183 Turkey, which hoped to assume a leadership 
role in the promotion of democratization in the Islamic world by taking advantage of 
its invaluable assets, needed to prove its will to act in order to consolidate its position 
as a soft power. The Turkish government’s decision to participate in UNIFIL II was 
an extension of its endeavor to get recognition not only from its Western allies, but 
also from its Muslim neighbors as a legitimate soft power. 184  Since Turkey 
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maintained cordial ties with Israel, Lebanon, and other Muslim states including Syria 
and Iran, it could demonstrate its indispensable value as a neutral third party actor 
through active participation in UNIFIL II, which was part of the international efforts 
to resolve conflicts in the Middle East. An article published in Financial Times 
explains the Turkish government’s intention to consolidate its soft power role 
through participating in UNIFIL II:   
Turkey’s decision sends out an important message about Turkey’s strategic 
intentions…Turkey ruled much of the Middle East, including Lebanon, until the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed in the World War I. Since then its clout in the region 
has appeared to diminish despite its huge military capability and modern 
economy. Erdoğan has been more willing than his predecessors to insist on 
Turkey’s credentials both as a regional power and in the wider attempt to avoid 
a chasm between Islam and the West…Turkish diplomats say he has been 
seeking opportunities to display and project the country in those roles. The 
chance to participate in the Lebanon force is an ideal one. The deployment of 
Turkish troops in Lebanon would give Ankara a say in the resolution of an 
increasingly diffuse Middle Eastern question, fitting Erdoğan’s vision of Turkey 
as a mediator in the conflict.185 
 
The Turkish government’s consistent emphasis on the humanitarian dimension of the 
operation and its justification of Turkey’s involvement on the basis of historical and 
cultural ties with Lebanon were also closely related to its intention to be firmly 
recognized as a soft power. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement in a joint news 
conference with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan right after the TGNA’s 
endorsement implicitly indicates this intention. The Prime Minister said, “Acts of 
violence have come to an end and hopes have risen again for a lasting political 
settlement after approval of resolution by the UN SC. Now, we should consolidate 
the ceasefire, and make peace and stability permanent in the region. Turkey will 
fulfill its historical and humanitarian commitments in this process. That’s why we 
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have decided to contribute troops to UNIFIL.”186 
Another strong motivation of Turkey in deciding to participate in UNIFIL 
II was to facilitate its full EU membership. Turkey’s European orientation dates back 
to the early 1920s when the founders of the Turkish Republic saw it as the sole way 
to modernize the country. To solidify its position in Europe, Turkey has long been 
hoping to be integrated into the EU. With the coming of the 21st century, Turkey’s 
desire to become a member of the EU has further increased, since evolving into a 
liberal-pluralistic society as part of the integration process with the EU was 
considered the best strategy for Turkey to prevent itself from being isolated in the 
globalizing world. 187  Turkey’s long journey towards full EU membership gained 
momentum following the EU’s decision to start accession talks with Turkey on 3 
October 2005. For Turkey to complete its Europeanization process with success, its 
support for the EU’s foreign and security policies was no less necessary than its 
undertaking of domestic reform to internalize European norms. UNIFIL II, which 
was formed with huge troop commitments by EU members, constituted a good 
chance for Turkey to show its willingness to cooperate with the EU in maintaining 
peace and stability in the Middle East. Turkey’s solidarity with EU members in 
Lebanon was also a good way of accentuating its European identity, which would 
help bring to fruition its bid for EU member status. A statement by Foreign Minister 
Gül at the parliamentary discussion on 5 September 2006 indicates Turkey’s 
commitment to UNIFIL II had much to do with promoting the attractiveness of 
Turkey in the eyes of Europeans:  
We should bear in mind that more than half of the authorized 15,000 troops will 
be sent by NATO and EU members, and the leadership role in the first period 
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will be assumed by our allies. Even Italy and Spain, which once withdrew their 
troops from Iraq, and both of which are currently ruled by left-wing parties, will 
take part in the new UNIFIL with a considerable number of troops… This 
behavior (Turkey’s decision to participate in UNIFIL II) is consistent with our 
legitimate claim that the EU can be transformed into a world power with Turkey, 
a reputable state having the unique characteristic of linking civilizations.188      
 
Through actively participating in UNIFIL II, Turkey could make itself more 
appealing as an essential part of the European community to many EU states that had 
already lauded Turkey’s troop commitment to Lebanon. Furthermore, as Olli Rehn, 
Enlargement Commissioner of the EU, said, Turkey’s strategic importance to Europe 
was once again highlighted with the outbreak of the military conflict in Lebanon.189 
In such a desirable situation, there was no reason for Turkey not to assume the 
peacekeeper role, which would have a positive impact on its bid for full EU 
membership.  
To summarize Turkey’s motivations for sending troops to Lebanon, 
showing itself as a core soft power in the Middle East and facilitating full EU 
membership by accentuating its European identity can be counted as the actual 
decisive motivating factors. It is true that Turkey has emerged as a state making net 
benefits from the economic relations with Lebanon since its troop commitments to 
UNIFIL II. However, economy-related motivation was not given a great prominence 
in the decision-making process. Economic benefits gained from Lebanon since 2006 
seem to be a natural consequence of Turkey’s increased role as a soft power in the 
region. In addition, both public opinion and indirect security concerns are far from 
having influenced the decision to become part of UNIFIL II.    
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4.2.2. South Korea’s Motivations 
Unlike in Europe, where dispatch of troops to Lebanon started to be 
discussed in mid-July, the same issue surfaced in South Korea after the UN SC 
adopted Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006, in which shared roles of the 
international community in reinforcing the peacekeeping force in Lebanon were 
officially requested. South Korea was concerned about the armed conflict in Lebanon, 
despite its remoteness, on the understanding that world peace cannot be sustained 
without peace in the Middle East, the region replete with chronic and intractable 
conflicts. However, a more serious concern for South Korea than what was going on 
in Lebanon around that time was North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. North 
Korea launched seven ballistic missiles over the East Sea on 5 July 2006. The UN 
condemned North Korea’s resumption of missile tests and imposed sanctions on 
North Korea by adopting SC Resolution 1695 on 15 July 2006. North Korea’s 
missile tests made the six-party talks fruitless, which started in 2003 with the purpose 
of finding a peaceful resolution to the security concerns coming from North Korea.190 
The South Korean government was very much shocked by the event, because it was 
pursuing the “Peace and Prosperity Policy” towards North Korea, which aimed to 
reduce tensions between the two Koreas through increased reciprocity. 191  North 
Korea’s nuclear denotation in October 2006 led the UN to adopt a stronger resolution, 
SC Resolution 1718, which clearly described the North Korean action as a threat to 
international peace and security. It also gave rise to the emergence of widespread 
skepticism in South Korea about the government’s lenient attitude towards the 
North.192  
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The South Korean government’s decision to participate in UNIFIL II was 
made around the time when the new nuclear crisis emerged on the Korean peninsula. 
However, the two events bore little relation to each other; in other words, the South 
Korean government did not take into great consideration the North Korean factor in 
the course of its decision about UNIFIL II. Indeed, there was no statement related to 
the North Korean situation in various official announcements on UNIFIL II, let alone 
in the record of various parliamentary discussions on the issue. 193  In addition, 
UNIFIL II was not even one of the major topics discussed in the September 2006 
summit talk between President Roh and President Bush. Christopher Hill, the US 
Assistant Secretary of State, said, “The South Korean government signaled its 
intention to participate in UNIFIL II during the summit…but there was no discussion 
on the issue between the two governments.”194 During the November 2006 summit 
talk, the same issue again remained outside the list of major topics, since it was 
considered a topic between the UN and South Korea.195 Given the aforementioned 
facts, it is hard to say that the South Korean government was motivated to take part 
in UNIFIL II by its security concerns, either direct or indirect. The fact that President 
Roh consistently sought to achieve the self-reliance of national defense throughout 
his tenure (2003 – 2008) makes the latter concern, or US pressure, simply dropped as 
one of the main motivations.196    
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Public opinion and economic gain were not decisive motivations of the 
South Korean government, either. Prior to the government’s final decision, many 
South Koreans were apprehensive that the safety of their troops might not be 
guaranteed in a dangerous place like Lebanon. A public survey conducted by the 
Korean Broadcast System, the biggest television network in South Korea, showed 
that 54.5% of South Koreans had a negative opinion of sending troops to Lebanon.197 
When it comes to economic considerations, it is true that South Korea’s exports to 
Lebanon have increased since 2007 as shown in Table 4. However, it accounted for a 
very small portion of the total export volume of South Korea ($228 million out of 
$422 billion in 2008). In addition, Lebanon remained a minor market for South  
 
Table 4. South Korea’s Exports to Lebanon and Other Four Countries  
in the Middle East (2005–2008)198 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Syria 400 12.4% 484 21.0% 607 25.6% 787 29.5% 
 
Jordan 467 -11.1% 359 -23.2% 386 7.6% 734 89.9% 
 
Iraq 68 -45.7% 108 59.8% 209 92.7% 368 75.5% 
 
Israel 849 -0.2% 746 -12.2% 969 30% 1,010 4.2% 
 
Lebanon 92 3.8% 90 -2.4% 142 58% 288 60% 
Exports volume (million $) / Comparison with the volume of previous year (%) 
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Korea even after 2007 as compared with the other four countries in the Middle East. 
Thus, it can be said that South Korea’s participation in UNIFIL II was not driven by 
either domestic pressure or profit-seeking.  
One crucial motivation of South Korea was the necessity to make its 
participation in the UN PKO activities commensurate with its international status. As 
the 11th largest economy in the world and one of the top 10 financial donor states to 
the UN peacekeeping budget, South Korea had an obligation to contribute to 
international peace and prosperity to a certain extent. South Korea’s personnel 
commitment, however, was far below the expectations of the international 
community. As of November 2006, South Korea had only 30 personnel who were 
serving as UN peacekeepers in six regions, as shown in Table 5. South Korea’s 84th 
place in a ranking of personnel contribution to the UN PKO activities was thought 
problematic and incommensurate with its position in the international society. Both 
top governmental officials and parliamentary members belonging to the Committee 
of Unification, Foreign Affairs, and Commerce had a common opinion that 
expanding participation in the UN PKO activities to such an extent equivalent to 
South Korea’s international standing is a way of promoting national interests.199  
  
Table 5. South Korea’s Participation in the UN PKO Activities (Nov. 2006)200 
 
 
 
UNMOGIP 
 
UNOMIG 
 
UNMIL 
 
UNAMA 
 
ONUB 
 
UNMIS 
 
Region 
 
India/Pakistan 
 
Georgia 
 
Liberia 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Burundi 
 
Sudan 
 
Personnel 
 
10 
 
8 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
7 
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Furthermore, former Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon’s election as UN Secretary-
General on 13 October 2006 acted as the catalyst for making the South Korean 
government awakened to the need for enhanced international roles.201 During a pre-
evaluation session for the bill on the dispatch of troops to Lebanon, Hee-Kwon Gu, 
the senior professional member representing the Committee of Unification, Foreign 
Affairs, and Commerce, said:  
As a member of the international community, South Korea has a responsibility 
to support the decision of the UN to keep international peace and stability. 
Especially, as the home country of the UN Secretary-General, South Korea has 
an obligation to play a leading role in humanitarian efforts to end conflicts and 
reconstructing. Therefore, it will be desirable if the National Assembly 
positively considers the bill on dispatching troops to UNIFIL II.202 
 
South Korea’s decision to participate in UNIFIL II had also much to do 
with the “National Defense Reform 2020.” Since 2006, South Korea has sought to 
transform its military structure into an information and technology intensive one and 
to raise the efficiency of national defense organization and management, so as to 
match the standards of the changing security environment and future warfare 
requirements. 203  Establishment of a standby arrangement system for overseas 
dispatch, which aims to facilitate active participation in the PKO activities, was 
selected as one of the twenty primary tasks of the reform.204 In an initial phase of the 
reform, participation in UNIFIL II was a good way of showing South Korea’s 
willingness and readiness to fulfill its plan. The Defense White Paper 2006 clearly 
demonstrates that South Korea will further increase its participation in the 
international peacekeeping activities by preparing an institutional framework as part 
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of the “National Defense Reform 2020.” Expanding participation in the PKO 
activities is described in the paper as a way to contribute to enhancing the peace-
loving image; securing international support for the problem on the Korean 
peninsula; and consolidating South Korea’s diplomatic influence in the international 
arena.205 It is thought that the South Korean government’s decision to send troops to 
Lebanon was an early reflection of the defense reform aiming to increase South 
Korean armed forces’ international role in the 21st century.     
To summarize South Korea’s motivations for sending troops to Lebanon, 
making its participation in the UN PKO activities commensurate with its 
international status and fulfilling the “National Defense Reform 2020” can be 
counted as the actual decisive motivations. US pressure had little to do with the 
South Korean government’s decision to send troops to Lebanon despite North 
Korea’s resumption of missile tests. Similarly, the impact of public opinion and 
economic consideration on the decision was absent. 
 
4.3. Motivations for Sending Troops to ISAF 
4.3.1. Turkey’s Motivations 
In the early 2000s, the political and security situation of Turkey was 
relatively stable thanks to a number of positive developments. The mutual assistance 
between Turkey and Greece after the devastating earthquakes in the summer of 1999 
brought about a new period of reconciliation in the two countries’ relations. Both 
countries’ positive approaches towards each other created a new hope for the 
peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK 
leader, in February 1999 also led to a sharp decrease in the number of the PKK 
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insurgencies in the southeastern region of Turkey. Furthermore, the EU, which had 
rejected Turkey’s bid for candidacy in the 1997 Luxembourg summit, reversed its 
stance and formally declared Turkey a candidate at Helsinki in December 1999. 
Turkey also felt relieved to a great extent from the international criticism on the 
human rights and democratization issues, as its strong relationship with Israel helped 
lessen pressure on it in the US Congress, and, moreover, the new Bush 
administration did not necessarily emphasize such issues. In contrast to the political 
and security situation, the economic situation of Turkey in the same period was quite 
problematic. The 1999 economic reform program supported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) ended up with no success. In February 2001, Turkey was hit 
by the worst economic crisis in its modern history. Due to the crisis, its GNP fell by 
around 10 percent, the rate of inflation reached 92 percent, and domestic debt 
reached over 80 percent of GNP. 206  As a result, Turkey was in dire need of a 
continued and increased international economic support to get out of the financial 
crisis as soon as possible.  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States occurred when Turkey was 
placed in a mixed circumstance, politically hopeful but economically problematic. 
Less than a month after the tragic event, the Turkish government was endowed with 
full authority for troop commitments to Afghanistan by TGNA, which had no 
limitation on duration and scope.207 In the course of the government’s decision and 
then parliamentary approval, public opinion was left out. According to the results of 
an opinion poll conducted by the Ankara Social Research Center, approximately 80 
percent of the Turkish people were opposed to the government’s decision to send 
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troops to Afghanistan.208 Abdullah Gül, then a member of TGNA from the AKP 
party, also argued during the parliamentary discussion on 10 October 2001 that the 
government decision was made without considering the Turkish people’s general 
opinion. He said: 
 ...one of our responsibilities is reflecting public opinion. When we look at the 
results of an opinion poll conducted by KONDA, one of the two independent 
organizations, 71 % of Turks are now against the decision. The results of an 
opinion poll conducted by the other independent organization, ANAR, show 
that 86 % of Turks think the decision wrong. We have this responsibility and 
thus find dispatch of the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries 
inappropriate under the current situation full of uncertainties about the scope, 
restriction, and duration of the dispatch.209    
 
Thus, it can be said that public opinion was not a main motivating factor in Turkey’s 
decision to dispatch troops to Afghanistan. 
When it comes to economic consideration, it is true that Turkey sought 
some economic compensation for its military support in ISAF. Participation in ISAF 
was burdensome for Turkey, which was in severe financial crisis, because it was 
agreed in UN SC Resolution 1386 that the expenses of ISAF would be borne by the 
participating states, not by the UN. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit said in an interview 
that Turkey’s taking over the command of ISAF II would certainly be an added 
burden on the Turkish economy.210 Although Turkey was willing to actively 
participate in the international force, its economic situation was an impeding factor. 
Financial support was one of the conditions of Turkey’s accepting the ISAF II 
leadership. In response to Turkey’s request, the United States, which wanted Turkey 
to assume the leadership, pledged $228 million financial aid ($28 million in Foreign  
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Table 6. Turkey’s Exports to Afghanistan (2001–2007)211 
 
Year 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Exports 
 
6,983 
 
20,232 
 
36,489 
 
69,311 
 
113,232 
 
91,106 
 
109,008 
Unit (Thousand $) 
Military Financing and $200 million in Economic Support Funds) in March 2002.212 
Along with financial aid, the United States also promised that it would cooperate 
with Turkey on the plans for reconstructing Afghanistan.213 Since it was initially 
expected that a market of $50 billion would appear in Afghanistan during the 
reconstruction process214, the Turkish business sector could get a considerable share, 
which would consequently be helpful for the improvement of the Turkish economy 
to a certain extent. Indeed, as shown in Table 6, Turkey’s exports to Afghanistan 
have gradually increased since 2002, especially in construction-related materials. 
Although the financial pledges were not guaranteed ahead of TGNA’s granting 
unlimited authority to the Turkish government in October 2001, it is hard to say that 
Turkey’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan was made entirely free from 
economic considerations. However, Turkey’s economic considerations were closely 
linked to a more crucial motivating factor, friendship with the United States. 
One of the decisive motivations of Turkey was no doubt to solidify its 
cordial relationship with the United States. Not only political decision-makers, but 
also top-ranking generals in Turkey were aware that US cooperation was the 
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essential element for promoting Turkey’s interests in political, economic, and 
security issues. US support had already been proven very crucial in the capture of 
Abdullah Öcalan and in the EU’s Helsinki decision.215 Turkey needed continuous US 
support for making favorable a stack of critical issues, such as the Cyprus problem, 
the PKK problem, and developments regarding the European security and defense 
initiative. Especially, in order for Turkey to secure constant financial support from 
the World Bank and the IMF, US leverage in the global economy was indispensable. 
Participation in ISAF was seen as a good opportunity to enhance Turkey’s 
importance in the eyes of American decision-makers. Through showing solidarity in 
Afghanistan with the ally that had suffered great pain from the unprecedented 
terrorist attacks, Turkey could consolidate its strategic relations with the United 
States, and even improve the scope and intensity of the relations. Prime Minister 
Bülent Ecevit revealed this motivation in a speech given to the parliamentary group 
of his party. He said, “The United States showed it was a true friend in our decades 
of fighting against separatist terrorism. Therefore, our contribution to the operation 
started in Afghanistan against terrorism is a debt of friendship and humanity.”216 
Solidarity with the United States was also highly emphasized in the bill of Prime 
Ministry submitted to TGNA for the approval to send troops to Afghanistan. Words 
like “our friend” and “our ally” were clearly used and the continuous US support for 
Turkey in the previous years was highlighted.217 In short, it can be said that Turkey 
was highly motivated to participate in the peace operation in Afghanistan by the 
intention to make itself a more valuable friend to the United States. 
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To highlight the counter-terrorism efforts was also a crucial motivating 
factor for Turkey. For decades, Turkey has been a target of PKK terrorist attacks, 
which have incurred severe domestic insecurity. Despite Turkey’s constant calls for a 
joint action against terrorism, the world, especially Europeans, had been soft on the 
issue prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For instance, many European states had 
formerly declined to include the PKK on the EU’s list of illegal terrorist 
organizations. When international terrorism came to the forefront as a result of the 
terrorist attacks on the United States by Al-Qaeda, Turkey got a chance to more 
easily form a united front against the PKK terrorist attacks. Through actively 
participating in ISAF, an important part of the global effort to fight terrorism, Turkey 
could prove its belief that terrorism is a common challenge requiring a common 
response. Turkey’s commitments to ISAF would also have a positive impact on 
drawing further international attention to its endeavor to cope with PKK terrorism. 
Indeed, the Turkish government strongly believed that participation in the operation 
in Afghanistan along with the United States would be helpful for solving its own 
terrorism problems. In the parliamentary discussion on the troop commitments to 
Afghanistan, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit said: 
It was natural for Turkey to stand next to the United States. However, that was 
not just a result of consideration on debts or fidelity. That, at the same time, 
was a result of evaluation on the huge chance to relieve Turkey from the 
disaster of terrorism. When the United States, which is the world’s most 
powerful state, starts the fight against terrorism, Turkey, which has been 
suffering from acts of terrorism for 15 – 20 years, should act alongside with the 
United States.218 
 
It is also true that the Turkish military had a view that the commitment of the US, the 
sole superpower to fight terrorism globally, was in Turkey’s interest in terms of 
struggling against the PKK and thus was in favor of cooperating with the United 
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States.219 Given the fact that the Turkish military’s influence in the decision making 
process was relatively strong, the military position might be highly reflected in 
Turkey’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan. Thus, it can be said that Turkey 
sought increased international action against all terrorist activities through its 
determination to contribute to combating global terrorism in Afghanistan.   
Turkey’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan had also much to do with 
the transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in the 21st century. In the face 
of the swiftly changing security environment of the 21st century, Turkey embarked 
on a modernization program enabling the TAF to have strategic mobility for joint 
operations. The military strategy also started to emphasize “forward defense,” 
“military contribution to crisis management,” and “intervention in crisis,” along with 
traditional concepts like “deterrence” and “collective security.” 220  Hüseyin 
Kıvırıkoğlu, the former Chief of the General Staff, reaffirmed this change by saying 
that the rapid deployment of the TAF in distant places is of vital importance in the 
new era.221  Turkey’s participation in ISAF clearly corresponded to the new reform 
of the TAF. ISAF was a conspicuous example of international “crisis management,” 
and thus Turkey’s military contribution was an expected behavior based on the new 
strategic concept. The establishment of PfP Training Center in 1998 and many other 
organizational settings like the creation of a “Peacekeeping Department” in all the 
services (army, navy, and air) were also related to the TAF’s emphasis on peace 
operations in the 21st century.222 
To summarize Turkey’s motivations for sending troops to Afghanistan, 
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solidifying its friendly relationship with the United States, highlighting the counter-
terrorism efforts, and carrying out the transformation of the TAF in the 21st century 
can be counted as the actual decisive motivations. In addition, the deterioration of the 
Turkish economy in the early 2000s caused Turkey to seek some economic benefits 
from the military support in ISAF. Turkey was not under US pressure during the 
decision-making process; rather, it was willing to participate in ISAF to help its key 
ally. Furthermore, there was no public opinion in Turkey which could direct the 
government towards the troop commitments to Afghanistan. 
 
4.3.2. South Korea’s Motivations 
South Korea entered the 21st century with the desire to promote 
reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas through improved dialogue. 
In June 2000, South Korean President Dae-Jung Kim and North Korean leader Jong-
Il Kim met in Pyongyang and released a joint declaration on enhancing mutual trust 
by cooperating on economic projects along with other efforts in the civic and cultural 
fields. This historic event brought a significant change to the South Korean people’s 
perception of North Korea and resulted in the development of inter-Korean 
relations.223 South Korea’s policy of engagement had been compatible with the US 
attitude towards North Korea until the election of the Bush administration. The Bush 
administration was critical of the former Clinton administration’s policies involving 
North Korea and conducted a policy review on the US-North Korean relations in 
February 2001. The 9/11 terrorist attacks made the Bush administration take a 
tougher stance towards North Korea, and even to designate it as a member of the 
“axis of evil.” South Korea faced a dilemma following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
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because it did not want any change in the policy of engagement with North Korea, 
whereas the United States was getting more and more unhappy with the North 
Korean regime.          
South Korea’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan is hard to explain 
without considering the motivation to assist its key ally that experienced formidable 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Just two days after the crisis, the National 
Assembly of South Korea adopted a resolution condemning the terrorist attacks on 
the United States. It was clearly stated in the resolution that South Korea would 
provide all possible assistance to help the United States and cooperate in the 
international efforts to eradicate terrorism.224 In the 33rd South Korea-US Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM) held on 15 November 2001, Dong-Shin Kim, then 
Minister of National Defense, reiterated the South Korean government’s 
determination to offer all necessary support for the US effort to root out terrorism 
and reaffirmed the importance of close South Korea-US cooperation across the 
spectrum of counter-terrorism activities. 225  In addition, the South Korean 
government’s aim of enhancing its friendship and cooperation with the United States 
through dispatching troops to Afghanistan was clearly revealed in a statement by the 
Minister of National Defense at the Committee of National Defense. He said, “As a 
member of the UN, the government is going to dispatch troops with the aim of 
contributing to the peace and stability of the world through participating in the 
international solidarity movement supporting the US efforts to eliminate terrorism, as 
well as promoting sustainable development of the South Korean-US alliance in the 
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future.”226 In the meantime, it is worth noting that South Korea’s decision to send 
troops to Afghanistan was not a result of US pressure. The South Korean government 
put forward a proposal concerning the dispatch even before the United States made a 
request.227 The main reason to take such action in advance was the South Korean 
government’s circumspect calculation that early dispatch would be more beneficial 
for development of the South Korean-US relations in the years to come. The fact that 
South Korea was maintaining the most amicable relations with North Korea in its 
modern history since the end of the Korean War also indicates that the decision had 
little relevance to US pressure. 
It appears that South Korea did not gain economic benefits from its troop 
commitments to Afghanistan during the first period of dispatch (Late 2002 – 
2007).228 As shown in Table 7, there is little difference between South Korea’s 
exports to Afghanistan before 2003 and those after 2003. Furthermore, South Korea 
was much more inclined to provide financial aid in grants for the Afghan people. For 
instance, the South Korean government announced at the International Conference 
on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo in January 2002 an  
Table 7. South Korea’s Exports to Afghanistan (2000–2006)229 
 
Year 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
Exports 
 
84,098 
 
95,013 
 
127,909 
 
124,597 
 
165,315 
 
97,060 
 
79,000 
Unit (Thousand $) 
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assistance plan worth over 45 million US dollars to help rebuild Afghanistan.230 
Therefore, it is hard to regard economic considerations as a strong motivating factor 
influencing South Korea’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan. 
South Korea withdrew all of its military personnel from Afghanistan in 
December 2007, leaving a small civilian reconstruction team there. Two years after 
the withdrawal, South Korea made a decision on troop commitments to Afghanistan 
again. Since many South Koreans still had vivid memories of the death of sergeant 
Jang-Ho Yoon in a terrorist bombing in February 2007 and 21 hostages held by the 
Taliban in July 2007, overcoming opposition from the public was difficult. Indeed, 
almost half of the South Korean people were opposed to the idea of sending troops to 
Afghanistan, and even the Democratic Party, the main opposition party, adopted an 
official party line against the dispatch and did not attend the National Assembly vote 
as a way of protesting the government’s decision.231 In the course of making the new 
decision, the South Korean government took into consideration the development of 
the bilateral relationship with Unites States as it had done before. Since the launch of 
the Myung-Bak Lee administration (2008 – current), strengthening the South Korea-
US strategic alliance, which was agreed on as the substitute for the traditional allied 
partnership at the Camp David summit meeting in April 2008, has been one of the 
three primary foreign policy objectives of South Korea. The new administration has 
endeavored to develop the alliance not only in the realm of security, but also in the 
political, social, cultural and economic fields by sharing democratic and economic 
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values and broadening mutual trust. 232  Participation in ISAF was clearly in 
accordance with South Korea’s foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, it was much 
more desirable for South Korea, because the United States was just turning its 
attention from Iraq to Afghanistan with the election of Barack Obama as president 
and making an appeal to the international community for troop contributions. As Ki-
Yul Kwon, the senior professional member representing the Committee of National 
Defense, reported after evaluating the dispatch bill, the necessity to consolidate the 
South Korea-US alliance seemed to highly motivate the South Korean government to 
make a decision on participation in ISAF.233 
There was a more decisive motivation, however, than the motivation to 
consolidate the South Korea-US alliance. That motivation was to realize the national 
vision of becoming a true “Global Korea.” The Myung-Bak Lee administration 
aspires to make South Korea a more prestigious country and to find its place among 
the ranks of advanced nations through not only actively cooperating, but also 
offering solutions to common issues facing the international community. 234  The 
administration also has a view that South Korea should leave behind the habit of 
diplomacy narrowly geared to the Korean peninsula and adopt a more open and 
enterprising posture seeing the world stage as the appropriate platform for its foreign 
policy and national interest.235 One of the four strategic objectives that South Korea 
should follow in order to achieve its ultimate goal of becoming a “Global Korea” is 
to pursue a comprehensive and pragmatic foreign policy, and one key agenda for the 
objective is to expand South Korea’s international responsibilities and overseas 
                                               
232
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2010. Key Diplomatic Tasks, available at: 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/tasks/index.jsp 
233
 Committee of National Defense. 2010. The Evaluation Report: The Bill on Dispatch of the South 
Korean Armed Forces to Afghanistan: 6 
234
 Cheong Wa Dae, Office of the President. 2009. Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of 
the Republic of Korea: 12 
235
 Ibid. 
 ８９ 
contributions.236 South Korea has actually fulfilled that agenda to a great extent. For 
instance, South Korea increased its Official Development Assistance (ODA) volume 
from $699.1 million (2007) to $803.8 million (2008).237 It also became a member of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) on 25 November 2009 and pledged to 
increase its international aid up to the level of 0.15 percent of its GDP by 2012 and 
0.25 percent by 2015.238 The South Korean government’s decision to participate in 
ISAF was also part of fulfilling the agenda to expand South Korea’s global 
contributions. By contributing to the reconstruction of Afghan society, South Korea 
could take a step forward to becoming a respected global partner for building peace 
and promoting economic prosperity of the world. South Korea’s motivation can be 
drawn from a statement by President Myung-Bak Lee in the TV program called the 
Conversation with President on 27 November 2009: 
 
We are now in a position to help others. We are going to chair the G20 next 
year. South Korea is the first and only country after the World War II that 
becomes a member of DAC, and moving from receiver status to provider status. 
There are only two DAC members in Asia, South Korea and Japan. 
International contribution is our responsibility. Paying no attention to others’ 
problems is inappropriate for South Korea. The time is ripe for South Korea to 
willingly take part in the international activities of countering terrorism and 
keeping peace. I strongly believe that this is a way of sincerely fulfilling our 
international duty. I know that Afghanistan is a somewhat dangerous area. 
Despite the danger, approximately 150 civilian personnel are going to carry out 
peaceful services like medical treatment, agricultural training, and job training. 
Our troops will not join any combat operations, but merely provide protection 
for those who serve in Afghanistan.239       
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To summarize South Korea’s motivations for sending troops to Afghanistan, 
enhancing its friendship and cooperation with the United States was no doubt a 
decisive motivation in the decision-making process of the first dispatch. In the 
decision-making process of the second dispatch, as well as consolidating the South 
Korea-US alliance, realizing the national vision of becoming a true “Global Korea” 
was very crucial. There is no evidence that South Korea was motivated to send 
troops to Afghanistan by indirect security concerns (or US pressure). It is much more 
correct to say that South Korea’s decision to contribute troops to Afghanistan was of 
its own free will. Public opinion and economic considerations are hard to count as 
decisive motivating factors in the decision. 
 
4.4. Combined Results: Commonalities in the Motivations of Turkey and 
South Korea for Sending Troops to Peace Operations  
The findings from the case-by-case analyses allow us to list several 
commonalities between Turkey and South Korea, two states representing the “allied 
new middle powers,” in terms of what leads them to make a decision on troop 
commitments to peace operations. 
Firstly, the two liberalism-related motivations, that is, domestic pressure 
(public opinion) and economic consideration (profit-seeking) have little impact on 
the decisions of either Turkey or South Korea to send troops to peace operations. In 
the decision-making process of all the three peace operations, public opinion in the 
two states was generally formed against participation. In some cases, both 
governments also had to overcome the widespread objections of opposition parties 
(Turkey: ISAF and UNIFIL II / South Korea: ISAF - the second dispatch).240 In 
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addition, Turkey’s and South Korea’s troop commitments to the three operations did 
not necessarily produce positive changes in their economic relations with Somalia, 
Lebanon, and Afghanistan. The two states were even willing to provide financial aid 
in grants for the people of the three countries who had suffered from conflicts. 
Although it is true that Turkey sought some economic benefits from its initial 
participation in ISAF, that was an exception to Turkey’s general behavior with 
respect to peace operations. The crucial evidence proving the temporary impact of 
economic consideration on Turkey’s participation in ISAF is the fact that Turkey 
assumed the leadership of ISAF VII (13 February 2005 – 4 August 2005) and sent 
1,500 troops without seeking any financial compensation from the United States or 
NATO.241     
Secondly, both Turkey and South Korea are relatively free from US 
pressure (or fear of abandonment) when deciding to participate in peace operations. 
Although the United States was involved in the three case peace operations either 
directly (UNOSOM II and ISAF) or indirectly (UNIFIL II), Turkey and South Korea 
made decisions on troop commitments of their own free will. For instance, Turkey 
was in stark opposition to the US position favoring UNIFIL II’s engagement with 
disarming Hezbollah, and South Korea rejected constant US requests to send combat 
troops to UNOSOM II. The two states also did not connect their own security 
concerns, namely the PKK problem of Turkey and North Korea-related issues of 
South Korea, to the decision to commit troops to the three peace operations. This fact 
implies that security-related motivations, especially indirect security concerns, are 
not necessarily decisive in driving the two states towards troop contributions to peace 
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operations. At the same time, it is worth noting that both Turkey and South Korea 
were willing to take action in advance, if their key ally, the United States, took a 
stance compatible with theirs. The two states’ willingness to send troops prior to any 
US request was most clearly seen in the ISAF case. Both Turkey and South Korea 
pledged their troops just a few days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, thinking that an 
early decision would further consolidate their relations with the United States in the 
years to come. To sum up, it can be said that, unlike small powers, both Turkey and 
South Korea follow their own agenda on peace operations and are not highly 
disturbed by direct and relational security concerns at home.  
Thirdly, future-oriented ideational considerations, that is, intentions to 
increase their international clout through active participation in peace operations are 
the most decisive motivations of both Turkey and South Korea. In the course of 
deciding to participate in the three case peace operations, the two states were not 
necessarily motivated by short-term interests, such as immediate improvement of 
their security situations and obvious economic benefits. Rather, they were highly 
motivated by the forward-looking intentions to become multi-regional or global 
actors in the 21st century. The aim of both Turkey and South Korea to expand 
national influence beyond their traditional regions by participating in peace 
operations was well observed throughout the analysis. Turkey intended to prove its 
credibility as a proper model for the newly independent states in Central Europe and 
Central Asia (UNOSOM II), and to play a mediator role in the Middle East (UNIFIL 
II). Similarly, South Korea intended to raise South Korea’s international 
competitiveness by pursuing the “New Diplomacy” (UNOSOM II), and to realize the 
national vision of becoming a true “Global Korea” (ISAF). It can be said that Turkey 
and South Korea see participation in peace operations as a good way to obtain an 
 ９３ 
increased role in the international arena, which will consequently bring long-term 
national interests to them in the political, economic, and security fields. In other 
words, the internally constructed idea of becoming a leading player in a globalized 
world is a more crucial motivation than any other for Turkey and South Korea when 
deciding to participate in peace operations. 
Fourthly, both Turkey and South Korea paid due regard to the dynamics of 
their bilateral relations with the United States in their decisions to send troops to 
Afghanistan. In the course of deciding to participate in UNOSOM II and UNIFIL II, 
ideational considerations of the two states clearly took priority over any other 
motivations. In the ISAF case, however, consolidating the Turkish-US relations and 
the South Korean-US relations turned up as a crucial motivating factor for the two 
states, which was comparable to the ideational considerations. The United States had 
a vital security interest in Afghanistan, since it was attacked by the al-Qaeda terrorist 
organization using the area as a safe haven. For Turkey and South Korea, to help the 
United States, which was endeavoring to defend its essential security interests in 
Afghanistan, was the correct thing to do.  It can be said that when a peace operation 
directly concerns the core security interest of the United States, Turkey and South 
Korea are more likely to be motivated by their bilateral alliances, while when a peace 
operation is important but not necessarily vital for the United States, the two “allied 
new middle powers” are more likely to be motivated by their own ideational 
intentions to become a leading player in the 21st century world.  
Lastly, both Turkey and South Korea set to work on a reforming process to 
make their armed forces more suitable and swiftly ready for participation in peace 
operations. Early examples reflecting such reform were Turkey’s commitment to 
ISAF in 2001 and South Korea’s commitment to UNIFIL II in 2006. In the face of 
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the rapidly changing security situations of the 21st century, both states understood 
they could no longer remain indifferent to not only global threats such as 
proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, and piracy, but also other states’ conflicts and 
crises, and thus took the initiative in making their troops more available to help 
preserve the international order whenever they are requested. It can be said that 
Turkey and South Korea became determined to live up to their obligation as a 
credible member of the international community through contributing to maintaining 
peace and stability in the world. It is also expected that both Turkey and South Korea 
will continue contributing to international peace operations with enthusiasm in the 
future. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Peace operations are unique and indispensable instruments of the 21st 
century to maintain international peace and security. The nature, scope, and function 
of peace operations have evolved over the past 60 years and are continuing to 
develop in the face of a rapidly changing security environment. Turkey and South 
Korea, two representative “allied new middle powers,” have been participating in 
peace operations with great interest, despite their relatively short history in the field. 
These two states’ attitudes towards peace operations are far from grudging, but 
clearly willing and enthusiastic. Both Turkey and South Korea refrained from being 
present with merely symbolic numbers of troops whenever they decided to make 
troop contributions to peace operations. They participated in peace operations with 
more than company-sized troops possessing high professional skills.  In addition, 
Turkey and South Korea set to work on bringing institutional and legal modifications 
to their armed forces in order for them to be easily and swiftly ready for overseas 
dispatch. For both states, commitment to peace operations is not just a temporary 
action, which is different from the way many other nations that started participating 
in peace operations after the Cold War generally think. Turkey and South Korea 
make continuous efforts to be well prepared for participation in peace operations and 
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attach great importance to it. Furthermore, whether a peace operation carries a high 
degree of risk or whether a peace operation has a low level of economic and strategic 
attractiveness is not that important for Turkey and South Korea. Regardless of the 
danger and relevance a peace operation bears, these two “allied new middle powers” 
show their willingness to contribute to making the world a better place to live. 
Throughout my thesis, I have tried to find out the main source of Turkey’s 
and South Korea’s willingness to participate in the post-Cold War peace operations 
that are relatively risky and seemingly devoid of direct economic or strategic 
attractiveness to the two states. I have drawn states’ general motivations for sending 
troops to peace operations from realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and then 
determined four probable motivations of the “allied new middle powers” -- (1) 
indirect security concerns; (2) the domestic factor (public opinion); (3) potential 
economic benefit; and (4) ideational considerations -- for analyzing their actual 
impact on Turkey’s and South Korea’s decisions to participate in UNOSOM II, 
UNIFIL II, and ISAF, respectively. The consecutive case-by-case analyses have led 
to the conclusion that Turkey and South Korea were highly motivated by future-
oriented ideational considerations, that is, intentions to increase their international 
clout through active participation in peace operations. Both Turkey and South Korea 
endeavored to become multi-regional or global actors in the world of the 21st century, 
and the field of peace operations was accepted as the best platform on which they can 
prove their ability and capability to become such leading players. The empirical 
analyses also shed light on the fact that although Turkey and South Korea confronted 
different internal and external situations around the time of their final decisions to 
participate in the three case post-Cold War peace operations, one realism-related 
motivation (US pressure) and two liberalism-related motivations (public opinion and 
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potential economic benefit) were commonly less decisive for the two states. In 
addition, through taking a close look at the ISAF case, it was discovered that when a 
peace operation is of vital security interest to the United States, the dynamics of 
Turkey’s and South Korea’s bilateral relations with this key ally can have a decisive 
impact, tantamount to the impact caused by their own ideational considerations, on 
their decisions to send troops.  
The forward-looking ideas of Turkey and South Korea to achieve a multi-
regional or global status in the post-Cold War era through active participation in 
peace operations are by no means outcomes of simple momentary thinking. Rather, 
the ideas are results of the formative processes Turkey and South Korea have 
undergone since the early 1990s with the insight into how their long-term national 
interests can be best served in the new era. The two states commonly understood that 
incremental increase in their international reach would help them to enjoy lasting 
stability, security, and prosperity in the new era, and thus to seek a broader 
international role became the intrinsic part of their foreign policy tendencies. Since 
Turkey and South Korea will unchangingly strive to become important actors in the 
21st century world, their commitments to the field of peace operations will 
accordingly continue. As Turkey and South Korea have played key roles in keeping 
international peace and security thus far, the two states will remain credible and 
major contributors to peace operations in the future. It is clearly thought that the field 
of peace operations will constitute a foothold from which the two “allied new middle 
powers” will make a big leap towards becoming advanced and prominent players of 
the 21st century.  
My thesis contributes to the international relations literature, especially the 
peace operations literature, by providing the analytic perspective for understanding 
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the motivations of the “allied new middle powers” for sending troops to peace 
operations. This subject has thus far remained outside scholarly works, despite the 
emergence of those states as active peacekeepers in the post-Cold War era. I admit 
that motivations of all the states can never be completely explained, even if 
motivations of a group of states are known. However, it will be possible to better 
understand the motivations of more states on the basis of the motivations of the 
“allied new middle powers,” who are in the intermediate position between states that 
already possess accumulated knowledge about peace operations as well as enough 
capacity to assume an international role, and states that lag behind in both experience 
and capability. Besides, since it is highly likely that many newcomers in the field 
will follow the path the “allied new middle powers” have trod, what has been 
discovered in my work can be the starting point for future research. 
The topic of my thesis constitutes just a small part of the entire picture. 
Many issues related to peace operations and states’ motivations still remain unsolved. 
Here, I bring some issues, which are to some extent connected to what I have done 
and seem to be worth studying, to the attention of prospective researchers: 
 
 Priorities of Turkey and South Korea in the process of preparing for 
participation in peace operations and conducting field missions    
 Materialization of Turkey’s and South Korea’s decisive motivations for 
sending troops to peace operations and its impact on their future 
decision-making  
 Analogous patterns of the “allied new middle powers” in other 
international missions 
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 Similarities and differences in states’ institutional and legal bases for 
participation in peace operations 
 The degree of public acceptance of UN peacekeeping and non-UN 
peacekeeping in various states 
 The correlation between states’ former experience with peace 
operations and their next decision to send troops abroad   
 Rivalries among neighboring states for participation in peace operations 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TURKEY’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
Location Unit Duration Troop Size 
Somalia 
(UNITAF / 
UNOSOM II) 
Mechanized 
Company 
January 1993  
- February 1994 300 personnel 
(UNPROFOR) Regiment-level  Task Force 
August 1993 
- December 
1995 
1,400 personnel 
(IFOR / SFOR) 
Brigade-level 
Unit (Later Battalion-
level Unit) 
December 1995  
- December 
2004 
 
B 
o 
s 
n 
i 
a (EUFOR Althea) Infantry Unit  December 2004 
- Current 255 personnel 
Albania 
(Operation ALBA) 
Marine Battalion 
Task Force 
April 1997  
- August 1997  759 personnel 
Kosovo 
(KFOR) 
Battalion-level 
Task Force 
July 1999 
- Current 987 personnel 
Macedonia 
(NATO-led 
Operations) 
Company-level Unit August 2001 
- March 2003  
Afghanistan 
(OEF / ISAF) 
Special Forces (OEF) 
/ Company-level Unit 
~ Brigade-level Unit 
(ISAF) /  
2nd & 7th Commander 
of ISAF 
December 2001 
- Current 
300~1,500 
personnel 
Sudan 
(NATO’s Assistance 
to AU in Darfur) 
Air Force Unit June 2005  
- Current 1 C-130 aircraft 
Congo 
(MONUC) 
Transportation 
Support Unit 
July 2006 - 
November 2006 
1 C-130 aircraft 
  / 15 personnel 
Engineering  
Company /  
August 2006  
- Current 237 personnel Lebanon 
(UNIFIL II / MTF) Naval Unit October 2007 
- Current 4 naval ships 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SOUTH KOREA’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS 
 
Location Unit Duration Troop Size 
Somalia 
(UNOSOM II) 
Engineering 
Construction Unit 
July 1993  
- March 1994 
250 personnel 
(516 personnel  
in total) 
Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) Medical Team 
September 1994 
- May 2006 
20~40 personnel 
(502 personnel  
in total) 
Angola 
(UNAVEM III) 
Engineering 
Construction 
Battalion 
October 1995  
- February 1997  
200 personnel 
(600 personnel 
in total) 
East Timor 
(UNTAET) Infantry Battalion 
October 1999 
- October 2003 
420 personnel 
(3,328 personnel 
in total) 
Transportation 
Support Group 
(Navy & Air Force)  
December 2001 
- December 2003  
1 LST ship /  
4 C-130 aircrafts  
Medical Team  February 2002 
- December 2007 
60~100 personnel 
(750 personnel in 
total) 
Engineering 
Construction Unit 
February 2003 
- December 2007 
150 personnel 
(1,360 personnel in 
total) 
Afghanistan 
(OEF/ISAF) 
PRT July 2010 -  
100 civilians 
40 police officers 
350 military troops 
Lebanon 
(UNIFIL II) Infantry Battalion 
July 2007  
- Current  
359 personnel 
(1,681 personnel  
in total) 
The Somali Coast Naval Unit March 2009 
- Current 
1 destroyer /  
298 personnel 
Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) 
Engineering 
Construction Unit 
February 2010 
- Current 240 personnel 
 
